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Author(s): Andrew Demshuk

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Reinscribing *Schlesien* as *Śląsk*

Memory and Mythology in a Postwar German-Polish Borderland

ANDREW DEMSHUK

The waves of ethnic cleansing in the 1930s and 1940s uprooted millions of East-Central Europeans and forced them to make sense of new surroundings. The Polish settlers who replaced over three million Germans in the borderland of Silesia created a layered palimpsest of new, generally nationalized meanings on an unfamiliar territory. After exploring how and why Polish leaders and settlers reinscribed formerly German and Jewish sites of memory with Polish meanings, this article investigates how, when former residents returned to visit their lost homeland, both populations confronted the palimpsest's conflicting layers and unwittingly engaged in a transnational exchange of meanings.

On a June day in 1973, a German tourist in Wrocław pulled in at the Hotel Monopol and reserved his favorite room: a clean suite on the second floor with an old parquet floor and a view of the neoclassical opera house across the street. Hard times had hit the once-elegant establishment. Warm water was rare now. Leaks from most of the fixtures trickled across the bathroom's tile floor into a drain. And, most telling of all, he observed "one more small thing: the old doorbell fixture on the door has been coated over so thickly with colors that one can no longer read the German words 'butler, maid, house servant.'"¹ In an otherwise neglected room, this paint had been applied deliberately. Once among the classiest hotels in the eastern German metropolis of Breslau, the Monopol now served poorer clientele in Wrocław, Poland's fourth-largest city. It was structurally the same place, in the same town, but the expulsion of Breslau's war-ravaged German population and the settlement of Poles eager



Fig. 1. The Hotel Monopol in Wrocław in 2005. At this point in time, its internal and external appearance had not changed markedly since the initial repairs after World War II. Photo by author.

to erase the German heritage had transformed the Monopol and its city into a stage on which different actors now led the performance. Upon the earlier, Breslau stage, the tourist had played a prominent role as the Fürst von Hatzfeldt, a prince whose family palace had been one of the earliest neoclassical structures in Europe (1764), and whose baroque country castle in Trachenberg (Żmigród) dated back to 1641. Twenty-eight years after his expulsion, Hatzfeldt sought traces of a German past in a landscape quite literally painted over with new, Polish meanings. Like hundreds of thousands of other former residents of the German East, he went to Poland's West in search of his German *Stadt* but found himself stranded in the foreign meanings of a Polish *miasto*.

From Karelia to Armenia, the twentieth century's population shifts brought about an upheaval in the meanings ascribed to physical spaces. The Nazi genocide of Europe's Jews, the expulsion of Poles from regions annexed to the Soviet Union, the Polish communist regime's forced movement of Ukrainians from Polish Galicia into the annexed, formerly German territories, and other brutal population policies uprooted, and to

varying degrees eliminated, peoples whose ancestors had forged intimate meanings in multiethnic homeland spaces for hundreds of years.² Out of this trauma, surviving former residents in exile and new settlers on the land developed contrasting interpretations of the past, present and future importance of churches, fields, stones, and even the buried dead. In the wake of World War II, Breslau became Wrocław, the surrounding province of Schlesien (Silesia) became Śląsk, and about 3.5 million largely German-speaking natives in Silesia were replaced by Polish settlers. The province of Silesia is thus a historically valuable case study of a borderland in which, relatively recently, the *border itself* has shifted, and *most of the population with it*. According to Pierre Nora, the pressures of modernity have led real milieus of memory to become replaced with shared and commemorative *lieux de mémoire*, in which ties to the past are largely constructed and performed.³ After the population shifts of 1945 and 1946, the malleability of these “spaces of memory” allowed them to become reused like medieval parchment: new populations painted fresh inscriptions over the old, creating layered meanings on the same spaces.⁴

This *palimpsest reinscription* of Polish Silesia and its legacy for Silesia’s former and present inhabitants forms the central focus of this essay. On spaces that had been inscribed by a largely German cultural world for seven hundred years, Polish communists, nationalists and clergy joined a common campaign to invent and reinscribe “eternally” Polish meanings for Silesia, often harkening back to the land’s medieval Piast heritage. The diverse Polish settlers seldom believed the top-down mythology about lands which they knew had been largely shaped by German-speaking populations. For all this, after fleeing the Nazi-devastated Polish heartland or suffering expulsion from the eastern *kresy*—the borderlands ceded to the Soviet Union—they were anxious to undertake their own, grassroots reinscription in order to build a livable home. When Germans later traveled back to Silesia, both settlers and former residents confronted the palimpsest’s conflicting layers and, often unintentionally at first, engaged in a transnational exchange of meanings. Depending upon the time of travel, the chance to see the human face from the other side of Silesia’s history had potential to enhance understanding, even acceptance, among Germans for what Silesia had become, and among Poles for what it had been.

The partitioned meaning of memory spaces explored here emerged in the aftermath of a drastic watershed of events between 1938 and 1948,

and the process of reinscription itself derived varied meanings depending upon which region of the province is considered. For centuries, Silesia had been a borderland: a crossroads of trade, a periphery to be conquered by Polish, Czech, Habsburg and Prussian rulers, a realm of cultural meeting. As such, it has historically been a space in which local meanings are especially colored by outside influences. By the early twentieth century, nationalist mythologies had arisen in both Germany and partitioned Poland to invent Silesia as an ancient “German” or “Polish” land. Each mythology was a negative mirror of the other, a mutually exclusive depiction which anticipated the intolerance of the mid-century waves of ethnic cleansing. For unlike the previous shifts in regime and passage of trans-border trade, the experience of ethnic cleansing during and after World War II altered the human substance of the population itself, remaking the region in the ethnic-national image of its nationalist mythmakers (at least on the surface).⁵

To begin, this essay briefly summarizes the history of population migration and interethnic interchange in Silesia from the Middle Ages through the early Cold War era. The second section explores how communist Poland’s leaders and scholars established the official narrative of Silesia as the keystone in Poland’s so-called *Ziemie Odzyskane*, or “recovered territories,” and so deliberately reinscribed German *Schlesien* as Polish *Śląsk*.⁶ It was an ideology with roots in the wild dreams of a few nineteenth-century Polish nationalists, but which few mainstream nationalists (let alone the Poles in the streets) had ever imagined possible. Pierre Nora has observed that, even in national contexts free of ethnic cleansing, official narrators seek to sweep away or homogenize the layered, intimate meanings tied to spaces of memory to serve their own commemorative agendas.⁷ In the wake of wartime and postwar ethnic cleansing, this tendency had the capacity to become far more dramatic: because most or all of the indigenous population had been extracted from the space in question, historians and politicians were able to whitewash former meanings with little domestic opposition. Indeed, their work of forging new meanings and cloaking them as ancient appeared all the more urgent in the Cold War context, in which Poland’s leaders sought to prove that the removed population had no right to return to intimate spaces that had, they argued, never rightfully been theirs. Though Germans had built the Hotel Monopol in 1892, in a city formed by a German cultural milieu

since the thirteenth century, German inscriptions on the doorbells had to be blotted out, for they had no place in a city that, according to the new mythology, had simply forgotten its Polishness.

The third section examines the response of Polish settlers to their leaders' mythologizing and their struggle to find their bearings in Silesia in the aftermath of war and their own displacement. Rather than the eternally Polish Silesia promised in the propaganda, Polish settlers encountered the ruins of a German province. As Padraic Kenney observes, Polish elites had to invent the idea of a Polish Wrocław for the very reason that "in Polish memory, the city barely existed before 1945; its meager Polish ties, stretching back to the medieval Piast dynasty, were unfamiliar to most. Nowhere was there a feature one could recognize and call Polish without hesitation; the city was German in form and content."⁸ The sheer ubiquity of German memory spaces impeded settlers' search for peace and livelihood after recently suffering German-inflicted traumas. With even greater vigor than the state demanded, they destroyed German elements or invented their own meanings for them in order to fashion the very Polish Silesia that their mythmakers claimed had always been there. Nevertheless, because by their very actions they were consciously constructing the land's palimpsest character, there remained awareness, even curiosity, about meanings that had been there before, meanings that German visitors were uniquely capable of unlocking for them.

It was into this context of Poland's "recovered territories" that German Silesians passed through as *homesick tourists*, bearing special knowledge of a former world just beneath the surface of a new reality known intimately to Silesia's new residents. I have taken the term "homesick tourists" from *Heimweh Tourismus*, the German "tourism of homesickness," in which Germans ethnically cleansed from the East have traveled back to visit their lost homelands. Whether or not they saw themselves as "tourists," homesick tourists were engaging in a melancholy *tour* of sites and surroundings in which they were as much outsiders as a Polish tourist in East Berlin. The responses of both German visitors and the new Polish residents were strongly influenced by the period in which the interchange took place—whether in the late 1940s amid the German expulsion, in the mid-1950s before reconstruction had proceeded in earnest, in the transitional period of reconstruction and generational change in the 1960s, or after West Germany had recognized Poland's western border through the

Warsaw Treaty of 1970. To cover the greatest breadth of impressions, the fourth section will proceed chronologically through travel experiences in each of these periods. Early encounters in Silesia tended to reinforce to Germans that, despite surface traces that remained, the idealized world they remembered had died and was buried in 1945; but especially with the passage of time, travel also exposed German nostalgia for the past to the new meanings inscribed in Polish *Śląsk*. Simultaneously, Poles curious about the former *Schlesien* gradually began to tap into German memories and interpretations of local spaces they now inhabited. Certainly the motives and objectives of German homesick tourists and the Polish settlers they encountered varied widely, and travel experiences seldom resulted in an idyll of empathy between peoples recognizing their shared fate as forcibly moved populations. Nevertheless, in this brief historical moment when former residents were still alive in large numbers and capable of crossing the border, transnational encounters in Silesia brought about exchange, even understanding, between populations once estranged by ethnic cleansing on the very landscapes that had come to bear palimpsest meanings for both sides.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF SILESIA FROM *SCHLESIEN* TO *ŚLĄSK*

In general, Lower Silesia and the Silesian capital of Breslau had been oriented toward a German cultural world since the German migrations into the region which had followed the Mongol invasion of 1240. By the nineteenth century, Breslau and the surrounding cities had become home to a large and vibrant Jewish minority, most of which identified with the German milieu and added to its cultural pluralism.⁹ After the German elimination of the Jews and the Allied cession of Germany's prewar eastern territories (including virtually all of Silesia) to Polish administration through the 1945 Potsdam agreement, the former population was all but gone, replaced by Polish settlers for whom Lower Silesia was an entirely foreign land.¹⁰

Upper Silesia's population was historically mixed and dominated by a regional, dialect-speaking culture, which had taken on both Polish and German characteristics and been referred to as *Silesian*, *Schlonzok*, or (less kindly) *Wasserpolnisch*. German settlers migrated into Upper Silesia from

the Middle Ages onward and controlled the establishment of industry (most dense in the south and east). Polish-speaking workers flowed into the industrial region during the nineteenth century from the Poznań area, Galicia and the central Polish districts under Russian occupation. Some of the native Upper Silesians (notably the Polish nationalist politician Wojciech Korfanty) adopted a Polish orientation and even took the lead in agitating for greater Polish awareness.¹¹ Nonetheless, national identity remained ambiguous for many of the inhabitants. Almost two-thirds of Upper Silesians identified themselves as Polish in the 1910 census, but then roughly the same number voted for Upper Silesia to remain with Germany during the plebiscite of 1921, when the international community forced the population to choose its national allegiance and partitioned Upper Silesia between the German and Polish nation-states. Attempts to classify the population continued during the interwar period, as hundreds of thousands of Upper Silesians identified by their neighbors as part of the Polish or German minorities faced persecution and migrated across the border. Nationalist territorial claims and racist attacks increased on both sides.¹² In Polish Upper Silesia, clubs formed to commemorate Polish “insurgent” attacks after the plebiscite and organize anti-German demonstrations, while many “German” Upper Silesians lost their jobs and status. In German Upper Silesia, clubs formed to commemorate German *Freikorps* attacks after the plebiscite and defend Germany’s “bulwark” in the East, while the Slavic-sounding town of Zabrze was renamed Hindenburg, effacing its *Schlonzok* roots in favor of a hero of the German nation. Yet though many Upper Silesians did identify strongly with the German or Polish sides in the interwar period, the majority felt local identity to be far more important than declaring for either nation.¹³ Economic considerations, regional particularities and Catholicism remained the preferred categories for identity.¹⁴

World War II and its aftermath witnessed the greatest persecution of local particularism and triumph of national intolerance. Immediately following their 1939 invasion of Poland, the Nazis arranged *Volksliste* to “verify” some Upper Silesians as salvageable racial material and, conveniently, retain them as a continuous labor force for the region’s industrial base (while expelling “Poles” into the *Generalgouvernement*). After the Nazi retreat, the new Polish authorities inverted the *Volksliste* to retain “autochthonous” Poles, many of whom had been German just weeks

before. Thus, though many Upper Silesians had been killed or deported into the German occupation zones by 1948, a very sizable, “autochthonous” population of both German-speaking and bilingual natives remained as “evidence” of a supposedly “Polish” native population.¹⁵ Necessary for the continued operation of the industrial machinery, they also served the regime’s questionable allegation that Upper Silesia (and by extension all of Silesia) had never lost its Polish character and should therefore remain a part of Poland. For this reason, Polish settlers in Upper Silesia encountered an indigenous population still operating the industrial infrastructure—tied by memory and tradition to the spaces around them and retaining a more complicated sense of ethnic identity. Due to persecution of their German language and cultural traditions (especially during the Stalinist regime of the early 1950s), many of these natives came to feel a stronger attachment to distant West Germany, and hundreds of thousands emigrated there in the 1950s and especially the 1970s. In contrast to their parents’ sustained attachment to the German language and culture, Upper Silesian children tended to adopt the Polish culture around them.

Despite their diverse backgrounds (to be explored later in this essay), the Polish settlers who arrived in Silesia shared a recent history of extreme suffering during the Nazi occupation. Surrounded by traces that reminded them of the Germans who had oppressed them just months before, they coped with their hardships in the immediate postwar context of forced resettlement by adopting nationalist myths that they seldom believed.¹⁶ At the same time, Germans exiled in the West commemorated idealized eastern spaces that they would steadily come to realize only existed in the safe but ungraspable world of their memories.¹⁷ Regardless of the mutually exclusive myths propagated by nationalist elites on both sides about “lost” or “recovered” spaces, these partitioned meanings about the same land had potential to merge back together when unsuspecting German-Silesian visitors like the Fürst von Hatzfeldt penetrated the fresh border on the Neisse river to visit palimpsest lands now inhabited by Polish residents.

THE INVENTION AND REINSCRIPTION OF SILESIA
AS A “RECOVERED TERRITORY”

With the removal of a native German population that had forged intimate interpretations for local *lieux de mémoire*, Polish communist politicians, nationalist scholars and Catholic clergy were unfettered in their drive to invent and propagate an “eternally Polish” *Śląsk* on soils where the buried dead had largely spoken German. It was an ironic marriage of convenience, driven above all by the common Polish interest in retaining the new territories amidst a Cold War climate wherein the West German regime and its American and British supporters supported some form of border revision at a future peace conference.¹⁸ In an attempt to reverse their long-standing unpopularity in Poland, the communists hijacked populist, nationalist anti-German rhetoric and preached the move west as a historic opportunity to redress centuries of German transgressions. To achieve the higher, common aim of weakening Germany permanently through conquest of the “recovered territories,” most nationalists overcame their traditional reservations and (rather than emigrate) put themselves at the service of the communists. For all their disapproval of communism in principle, much of the Polish clergy gave in to deep-seated anti-German sentiment (dating back to the nineteenth-century Prussian *Kulturkampf*) and regularly preached state mythologies about the “recovered territories” in sermons which, as Wrocław University Germanist Marek Zybura observes, “could just as easily have come from a government propagandist.”¹⁹ Although the majority of the Polish reinscription of Silesia took place in the immediate postwar years, the process continued through the following decades. All along, official speeches and histories praised the province’s ongoing transformation by invoking the myth that Poland had recovered historic Polish lands.

Rhetoric about Poland’s need to “return” to its medieval Piast borders stemmed from the nationalist “western idea” (*myśl zachodnia*) which had germinated during the time of partition in the nineteenth century—the same era in which, as Brian Porter observes, Polish nationalism had developed into a more exclusive “vehicle for the exertion of social control and the establishment of mutually antagonistic identities.”²⁰ This platform found its ideological roots in the writings of Roman Dmowski and his rightist National Democratic Party (Endecja). Already by 1912,

Wacław Nałkowski went further than most of his rightist peers by explicitly recommending that a resurrected Poland should have a border with Germany on the Oder and Neisse.²¹ It should be emphasized, however, that the most extreme territorial demands (such as the annexation of Lower Silesia and Breslau) made little sense to most nationalists (to say nothing of the Polish public) until World War II, during which time Polish exiles' territorial claims against Germany were constantly increasing in scope.²²

From the end of World War II onward, the nationalist-Catholic "western idea" became state doctrine under the communists, who rightly saw it as an ideal way to strengthen their appeal with rightist forces that had traditionally been hostile to them.²³ As a high-profile example of the communists' adoption of the western idea, Communist Party Secretary Władysław Gomułka declared in a 1946 Wrocław speech that the four million Poles living in the ruins of formerly German cities were in fact participating in a momentous "return as the lawful possessors of your land, taking it in possession as your ancestral native soil." Confronting the historic German presence on the land, he added "the Germans could Germanize this land through force and pressure, through centuries of politics of denationalization and colonization, but there are no means to Germanize history."²⁴ As Jewish émigré S. L. Schneiderman observed during his 1946 return visit to Poland, the defense of Poland's right to Silesia was the regime's most popular slogan.²⁵ From the last months of the war onward, the only major difference between communist territorial claims and those of the London government in exile involved the *kresy* lost to the Soviet Union. Like the communists, Polish nationalists in Western exile ceaselessly demanded the retention of Silesia, Pomerania and Masuria, but they always added their insistence that the far-flung eastern *kresy* be returned to Poland from the Soviet Union. In contrast, the *kresy* were officially a taboo subject in communist Poland until the end of the Cold War.²⁶

Nationalist research institutes and scholarship embarked upon yet more elaborate inventions of Poland's "ancient" history in the west. The West Institute (Instytut Zachodni) was founded in Poznań in 1945, followed by the Silesian Institutes in Opole and Katowice. Their purpose was in continuity with interwar research societies, such as the Baltic Institute in Toruń, which had pushed Polish national claims to western regions. During World War II, exiled Polish scholars had expanded their histories

of Poland's eternal battle with the Teuton and its right to "recover" spaces which Germans had "conquered" from the Polish nation, leading to enlarged claims which even included entirely German cities like Breslau. An English-language volume for Western circulation published in 1947 by communist Poland's leading nationalist scholars lamented that Versailles had left Poland "a limbless trunk, surrounded by Germany" and affirmed that, because "the power of contemporary Germany grew up at the expense of Poland," only "a strong Polish State with a western orientation will become the most effective brake on German activities, which are capable for the third time of bringing the world to disaster."²⁷ Geography and ancient history were said to ratify the new borders, since allegedly "the original nucleus" of Poland, and even Slavic civilization itself, had lain between the Vistula and Oder rivers, in the new western territories.²⁸ These ideas, rooted in prewar and wartime arguments, formed the template for most later literature, which was actively propagated by such dynamic organizations as the Association for the Development of the Western Lands (TRZZ, Towarzystwo Rozwoju Ziemi Zachodnich).²⁹

Clergy played at least as crucial a role in inventing and disseminating the "western idea." Though the Catholic Church generally opposed the communists, and though communist attacks on the church by the state sharpened in 1947–56, the western idea nourished a noteworthy means of coexistence between the Catholic Church and the communist state. As Juliane Haubold-Stolle observes, the Catholic Church worked closely with the communists to Polonize the "recovered territories," for in their eyes "the shift to the West was a chance to completely Catholicize regions that had earlier been Protestant."³⁰ Even twenty years after the end of World War II, the church in Poland was still completely at home with repeating the state doctrine, which had never received Vatican approval. Primate Stefan Wyszyński preached the western idea in the Wrocław cathedral:

Beloved, we read from stone relics, which in this cathedral are a sign of the centuries. And these stone relics, marvelous signs of the past, say: we were here, and we are here again. We have returned to the ancestral house.... These stones call to us from the walls, these bones that take their rest secure in the crypt speak to us from the earth in our mother tongue.... When we listen to their words, when we look at this Piast house of God, then we know that this is no German

inheritance. It is the Polish soul. It was never German and is not German. It contains the traces of our royal Piast tribe. They speak to the Polish people without commentary. We need no explanation. We understand their testimony.³¹

Wyszyński and many others professed that the very stones spoke Polish; reinscribing them with Polish meanings simply “restored” to them an outward articulation of their true nature. This sermon was in continuity with those of Wyszyński’s predecessor, August Cardinal Hlond, an Upper Silesian native turned Polish patriot who had played the leading role in ejecting the German clergy from the “recovered territories.” Pope John Paul II himself emulated these words when he visited Silesia in 1983, though he soon recognized the historical inaccuracies and delivered a very different sermon in 1997.³² Of course, to retain a balanced picture, one must also remember that many clergy members sought reconciliation with the Germans, culminating in the Polish and German bishops’ letters at the Second Vatican Council; spearheaded by Wrocław’s titular archbishop Bolesław Kominek (also a native of Upper Silesia), they called for mutual forgiveness.³³ In the end, however, most clerics who settled in the West collaborated with the nationalists and communists to reinscribe the formerly German spaces with eternalized Polish national mythologies.

Reinscription was especially strong in the immediate postwar years, when the German legacy most visibly challenged Polish claims. All German inscriptions were to be removed, while German monuments and buildings were to be “degermanized” or replaced with Polish ones. Many surviving “Prussian” buildings in Wrocław and Legnica (formerly Liegnitz) were disassembled so that their bricks could be shipped for the reconstruction of Polish structures in Warsaw.³⁴ Plunderers and grazing livestock devastated Wrocław’s German cemeteries, until at last city authorities dissolved them without public protest in the 1970s and used old tombstones to reinforce ditches, pens in the city zoo and the stands in the city stadium.³⁵ Though the Jewish cemetery survived, even here, as documented in a 1958 photograph, the tombstone of Germany’s first Labor Party leader became Polonized as the “Slav Jew” *Ferdynand* Lassalle, with Polish inscriptions detailing the dates.³⁶ By 1970, Polish tour books were documenting all of the city’s prewar Jews as Poles.³⁷ As Zbigniew Rowski reflected in a major Katowice newspaper in 1949, Polonization was imperative, lest the youth

become taken with the surrounding Prussian architectural legacy; they “might lose the good taste inherited from their parents and succumb in this manner to a certain Prussification. It is only natural that a Pole has better taste than a German and incomparably greater artistic abilities.”³⁸

Another prominent means of reinscribing *Schlesien* as *Śląsk* occurred through applying (usually inventing) Polish nationalist names for German towns, streets and landmarks. At times, the German designations were of relatively recent origin: Breslau’s “Street of the SA” (renamed from *Kaiserwilhelmstraße* by the Nazis) became Wrocław’s “Street of the Silesian Insurgents,” and the city of Hindenburg recovered its historic name “Zabrze.” Usually, however, the German names had been in use for some time, and the Polish names were either contrived without precedent or derived from Latin forms that had been dead for centuries. The plaza in Wrocław named for Prussian Napoleonic war hero Taubentzen became Kościuszko Square. Grünberg became Zielona Góra (both meaning “green mountain”), Bunzlau “returned” to its Slavic roots as Bolesławiec, and Katowitz, having already become Polish Katowice after the partition of Upper Silesia in 1921, was dubbed Stalinogród through the Stalinist years.³⁹ That Polish officials routinely misspelled or confused the new names of “eternally Polish” places testified all the more to their artificiality. Legnica (Liegnitz) was called Lignica, Żagań (Sagan) was Zegan, Żary (Sorau) was Żarów, Zgorzelec (Görlitz) was Zgorzelice, Nysa (Neisse) was Nisa, Kłodzko (Glatz) was Kładzko, even Kłacko, and Lwówek (Löwenberg) was confused with Lwów, a historic city in the *kresy*!⁴⁰

To fashion a Polish Silesia allegedly buried by time, Polish leaders applied imaginative reconstruction plans. In a 1946 article, city planner Emil Kaliski framed Wrocław as a metropolis “that once was perhaps more Polish than Krakow” and emphasized that reconstruction of its medieval architecture would be proof of the city’s “Polish birth certificate,” which through seven centuries of Germanization “has already faded, in some parts it is not legible any more.” By such logic, Wrocław’s true, Piast history had been buried under layers of a German city; it was to become “the antithesis” of the former German Breslau, connected “with Warsaw, Poznań, Łódź and Krakow in an indissoluble way.”⁴¹ While these plans to “medievalize” the Silesian capital were not fully accepted, they did affect the decision to focus limited postwar resources on restoring Gothic churches as evidence of a Piast past. When Jan Zachwatowicz, head of the

office for monument preservation and maintenance, laid out “programs and principles of monument preservation” in 1946, they emphasized that only “Polish” monuments were to be preserved. Likewise, Dr. Stanisław Lorentz, director of the Warsaw National Museum and later an expert for UNESCO, wrote in 1945: “we have neither reason to pity the monuments of German arrogance, nor the obligation to preserve them.”⁴² He sustained this perspective for decades. At a 1963 historical preservation conference in Williamsburg, Virginia, Lorentz told his largely credulous American audience that “German authorities” had taken over “Wrocław” in 1945 and ravaged it as the “Festung Breslau,” decimating a population falsely implied to have been Polish. Praising Polish work to uncover the city’s Romanesque, “purely Polish” history, he assured his audience that, “if any of the buildings [on the marketplace] were transformed in the nineteenth or twentieth century, they now regained their previous aspect. In cases where there was no documentation, the new buildings were made to suit the surrounding architecture,” which had of course been Polonized.⁴³ In keeping with the general atmosphere, the leading American architectural historian Turpin Bannister praised Lorentz’s “stirring account” in which the Polish people “consciously chose to *recreate their roots*,” and he enjoined American preservationists to take the Polish case as a model for how to deploy “carefully detailed historic data” in implementing reconstruction. Only the German-Jewish historian George Mosse critiqued Lorentz for failing to problematize Polish postwar reconstruction projects, whose selectiveness “is related, of course, to the didactic purpose, favoring the one past which, opposed to other pasts, the present feels worth preserving or re-creating anew.”⁴⁴ Even after Polish politicians became less willing to destroy German monuments after 1956, reinscription continued, as in the incident of a Wrocław baroque church’s “re-Piastization” as a gothic structure in the 1970s.⁴⁵

Regular ceremonies celebrated the “return” of “ancient Polish lands” and the triumph over Germanness, most famously the “Exhibition of the Recovered Lands” in Wrocław in the summer of 1948, by far one of the largest propaganda shows in communist Poland’s history. Over the space of three months, 1.5 million Poles visited the grounds of the monumental Hall of the People (Hala Ludowa), designed as the largest dome in the world only thirty-five years before by German architect Max Berg to celebrate German victory over the armies of Napoleon.⁴⁶ Did ordinary Poles

thronging about this monument truly believe that its stones had always “spoken Polish”? Living in cities largely built during the preceding Bohemian, Habsburg, Prussian and post-unification periods (all tied strongly to a German cultural milieu), did they accept myths about “recovered lands”?

POLISH LIFE IN FORMER GERMAN LANDS AFTER NAZISM

A 1951 census catalogued 4.5 million Poles in the former German territories: 2.5 million from the devastated stretches of central Poland, and the remainder from Poland’s broad eastern *kresy*, displaced person camps in Germany, and as far afield as Yugoslavia.⁴⁷ Because of their diverse origins, the Polish settlers in Silesia comprised a far from homogenous group, whose differing pasts influenced how they interpreted the unfamiliar world around them. Those from just across Silesia’s border in *Wielkopolska* (Great Poland) came from the core of the former Prussian partition of Poland and had known German oppression for a much longer time. This made them particularly aware of and hostile to the German heritage in Silesia. In contrast, refugees from the *kresy* faced the bitter loss of their homeland—a region that had once been part of the Habsburg and Russian partitions of Poland and had thus experienced far less contact with German nationalizing tendencies until the arrival of German armies during the First and especially the Second World War. They arrived, filthy and starving, in spaces already burned and plundered by Russians as well as Poles over the preceding months.⁴⁸ Nostalgia for the lost East and alarm at the contrast of Silesia’s urbanized, modern appearance to the rural idyll of the *kresy* played a large role for many of these refugees. They tied their goats to the ruins of art nouveau department stores and dreamed of open plains dotted with the thatched roofs of huts.⁴⁹ As Stanisław Ciesielski observes, the *kresy* lived on in the Polish imagination as a “bulwark” in the East populated by “pioneers,” symbolizing an “especially important part of the country, never to be renounced.” Not only the lower nobility (*szlachta zagrodowa*), but also the Polish (and considerably Jewish) cultural and scholarly metropolises Lwów (Lemberg, Lviv) and Wilno (Wilna, Vilnius) symbolized the historic importance of the *kresy*.⁵⁰

Of course, with two in three Poles uprooted by the end of the war, the traumas of homesickness and loss far transcended settlers’ experi-

ences in the former German territories. When a Polish socialist returned from Siberia in 1946 and visited his childhood home in central Poland, he lamented:

I did not meet a single familiar face. My house bears no resemblance to what it was before, and my school has been destroyed. The names of the streets and of the institutions have changed, even the colour of the trams is different. I walked for a whole day looking for details that I remembered—I found so few that I finally wondered if I had really spent sixteen years of my life in this town. The members of my family who survived, or the few friends who remain from this period, all are hundreds of miles away, or else they have changed as much as my town.⁵¹

In the end, it was the “frontier” atmosphere that differentiated the unfamiliar spaces of Poland’s new Western Territories from Poland’s historic heartland; as Padraic Kenney has observed, far more than in other regions of Poland, settlers in the new territories became a melting pot of Poles from every corner of the interwar boundaries. To be sure, Wrocław itself was a transitional city in which old regional attachments remained more important than a common sense of Polishness. “The shopkeeper or priest from the same district in Lwów province was more important than the workmate from Poznań who spoke and acted differently.” Nevertheless, unity emerged from the sense that all were pioneers in the “Wild West.” Amid a prevailing sense of division and uprootedness, communist objectives toward building the frontier became a tangible means of creating structure and a sense of community.⁵²

This frontier identity was particularly anti-German. The Nazi occupiers in Poland had decimated Polish spaces of memory and, through their cruelty, sowed memories hostile to all things German. Looking back on this time twenty years later in 1965, Polish bishops sought to explain the immediate postwar sentiment to their German colleagues at the Second Vatican Council: “Every German uniform, not only that of the SS, became for all Poles both a nightmare and a reason to hate all Germans. Every family in Poland had its dead to mourn. We recall Poland’s terrible night not to reopen wounds which may not have yet healed, but only to point out that one should try to understand us and our present way of thinking.”⁵³ Small wonder that, whether violently resettled from the *kresy* or

just seeking a better life out of the ruins in central Poland, settlers were generally united in their distaste for the German artifacts they faced at every turn and took solace in the idea that Silesia could be coated over with a timeless Polish veneer. As Poznań West Institute scholar Zbigniew Mazur reflects, “how can one live in a place full of German memorabilia, in a place where one has more or less no clue about origins, creators and history? How can one go into churches which still bear the remains of Protestant decorations in the galleries and act as though one could feel as at home as in Łuck, Sandomierz or even Poznań?”⁵⁴

This sense of alienation led settlers to engage with surrounding German traces in ways that strongly converged with the authorities’ and intellectual elites’ intentions—even though settlers knew that Silesia was not a “recovered territory.”⁵⁵ Amid hard times in a land that felt foreign, hostile and impermanent, they actively took part in making the mythology a physical reality around them, etching away German meanings and forging new ones, trying to fashion some sense of home and seldom caring that, in the process, the erasure of the German and Jewish past resulted in the destruction of much cultural value.⁵⁶ Even in cases where public officials sought to prevent the destruction of medieval German script, grassroots enthusiasm saw it done. Patterns of Polonization in multiethnic Upper Silesia were outwardly similar to what was going on in the rest of the province, save that here settlers also harassed much of the remaining indigenous population, whose members still tended to possess at least partial German identities. Although some Upper Silesians had previously chosen a Polish identity (or elected one now), persecution pushed many “autochthons” toward a greater sense of German identity at the same time that settlers sought to forge a totally Polish Upper Silesia.⁵⁷

For all their differing sites of origin, Silesia’s new inhabitants never doubted that the land had been a part of Germany, as evinced by the common saying of the time that their tenuous new possessions were “post-German” (*poniemieckie*).⁵⁸ As Mazur has shown, in some cases reinscription was casual in nature; Polish settlers simply had different habits during their free time and so left the yet-intact German parks and pubs to fall into decay.⁵⁹ At other times, disconnect with Germanness led directly to a desire to make the space familiar and Polish, as when the former Poznań student Joanna Konopińska expressed intense frustration with the German house in Wrocław that she had come to inhabit in autumn 1945:

I am sitting at the desk writing down my impressions, although it would certainly be better if I started cleaning the flat instead. Cleaning and sweeping out this foreignness, this Germanness, which is peeping out from every corner.... At present I am stumbling at every turn onto things which belong to somebody else, which testify to another life I know nothing about, which testify to the people who built this house, who have been living here and who now, perhaps, are not alive any more. How could one start a new life here? No I can't imagine that I will ever be able to say: This is my house.⁶⁰

Only with time did some settlers start to feel more at home. In 1964, bricklayer and amateur historian Feliks Kapes, born in Warsaw, traveled to Brzeg (Brieg) in Silesia and was reported to have been taken aback by an “optical illusion”: “I’m not in Warsaw’s old town: those two destroyed tenant buildings are nothing less than fragments of a historical city named Brzeg in the western territories.” From his attachment to a Polish aesthetic, he developed a love for Polish Silesia.⁶¹

Ultimately, the mingling of Poles from so many regions in a new space without its own distinct Polish regional identity produced a new “Polish people.” As Michał Sapieha, the head of the State Repatriation Office (PUR), reflected in summer 1945: “the goal of the settlement action is to distribute the Polish population so that, following a mutual influence, regional differences and provincial patriotism will disappear.”⁶² Rural Galicians from the lost *kresy*, bombed-out Warsawians, Poznanians with a long history under German rule—pushed together, often uneasily, into the same, alien space, they represented the new Poland as a whole, a Poland ruled by communists. Omnipresent fear that the Germans would not be content with such an enormous loss of territory encouraged the populace to tacitly accept communism and support Poland’s alliance with Moscow.⁶³ In this light, West German recognition of the Oder-Neisse border in 1970 sowed seeds for greater Polish opposition to the regime. Already during Christmas in 1970, without fear that the Germans would return without the communist regime’s protection, shipyard workers led uprisings in formerly German, “eternally” Polish cities such as Szczecin and Gdańsk to protest increased food prices—an event that forced Gomułka’s resignation. This culminated in the rise of *Solidarność* just a few years later in Gdańsk. It also helped Silesia’s Poles to feel at ease enough to

begin exploring other, older meanings tied to the memory spaces around them, meanings that the increasing number of German visitors after 1970 brought with them. Today's Polish Silesians, most of them born on the palimpsest forged by their parents and grandparents, have developed a genuine sense of responsibility for the region and its deeper history, something previous mythologies could never hope to inspire. Twenty-first-century Wrocławians generally sense that their hometown is as Polish as Warsaw, but with a German heritage that should be rediscovered.⁶⁴

TRANSNATIONAL MEETINGS ON A SHARED HOMELAND:
GERMAN TRAVELERS IN POLISH SILESIA

Hundreds of German travel accounts demonstrate that, by the late 1950s, an exchange of meanings had already begun between German travelers and Polish settlers in the palimpsest spaces of Silesia: Germans experienced Silesia as a Polish space, while Poles privately ignored political taboos forbidding discussion of the German past. This contradicts recent claims that, before 1989, Germans had little interest in what happened after Silesia “died” in 1945, just as Poles had little interest in the German prehistory.⁶⁵ From the mid-1950s Khrushchev thaw onward, the trickle of West Germans traveling into the former homeland steadily increased, expanding into a flood by the 1970s. The end of the Iron Curtain in 1989 summoned a final deluge of cross-border experiences at the same time that Poles could speak under less pressure about the German past, in this manner building on trends already underway through the preceding forty-four years.

The first two years after the war witnessed frantic, painful interchange between the departing Germans and the incoming Poles. With the land still in flux, the two sides seldom had enough emotional space to exchange meanings tied to charged spaces and experiences. During the first year, settlers from central Poland in Lower Silesia generally assumed that their stay would be temporary, and many went home when they failed to find a new livelihood. As Kenney observes, “those who left Wrocław often said they were returning ‘to Poland.’”⁶⁶ While Poles tried to survive in an alien world, Germans were shaken by personal experiences in their rapidly changing, increasingly hostile homeland or heard about such experiences,

which caused many to feel alienation from the physical spaces of Silesia already in the immediate postwar years.⁶⁷ Just before leaving his hometown in 1948, a German Silesian wrote to former neighbors already in West Germany: “When one goes through the streets of Steinau, one detects immediately that the foreign people who dwell there have little interest in caring for the streets and green spaces.... Cows graze about the graves of the Protestant cemetery, and no one cares for the burial places. The crypts are uncovered, and people search there for hidden treasures.” Alongside this sense that former spaces of memory had been desecrated by uncaring settlers, the Steinauer tried to empathize with his Polish neighbors, whom he found to be equally discontent with the situation in Poland’s West: “Most of them were also robbed of their former homeland (*Heimat*) by the Russians and hope to see it again soon. Matters for them are just as they are for us. They don’t feel right in a foreign land and sometimes understand our situation of need better than our own countrymen.”⁶⁸ In the eyes of the Steinauer, Polish settlers in Silesia knew what it was to be uprooted—and this meant he shared a closer bond with them than with his ethnic “countrymen” who had spent their lives in West Germany.

If, for all the encroaching change, the Steinauer could still cling to a vague hope that matters might yet be “set right” through a reverse migration by both populations, he was part of a declining minority; an overbearing sense of irreversible change in Silesia was being disseminated rapidly, especially through religious circular letters, a key means through which exiles kept in touch during the early postwar years. This was also the case in Upper Silesia, where a far more substantial native population had remained. As expelled pastor Leo Machinek warned his former flock in his 1947 Christmas letter, despite the reconstruction of their church by German-speaking Upper Silesians (Polish settlers had allegedly not played a part), the cemetery was already overgrown and, to the dismay of any farmer reading his report, “on the way from Leobschütz to the next village last summer, people panicked: there was such a cloud of thistle seeds, it was like a snowstorm.”⁶⁹ Farmland tilled for generations was apparently going back to nature, making it harder to reclaim with each passing year. By March 1948, the remaining Germans in Upper Silesia were writing to Machinek that Polish settlers were changing German inscriptions and infusing the land with their culture, all of which deepened a sense of alienation and yearning to leave. As he related to his flock: “In Silesia, an

exacerbated campaign was waged to push aside the last traces of German-ness. Speaking a German word costs high fines. German-sounding family names have to be Polonized. The struggle doesn't even stop before the dead in the graveyard. Gravestones with German inscriptions are knocked down or coated over." Because of this, his friends in Upper Silesia complained, "We are in the homeland but don't feel at home."⁷⁰

German Silesians exiled in the West knew of the reinscription taking place, knew that with each year Silesia conformed less and less to what they remembered and was steadily transforming into a Polish world that they could enter only as guests.⁷¹ After their legalization in May 1949, West German expellee political groups constantly protested this reality and demanded a physical return to the lost homeland. But for all of this bluster, fewer and fewer expellees were contemplating a return to the physical homeland that had turned "foreign." The trauma of ethnic cleansing prompted them to retreat into cozy memories of past spaces and devote their energies to preserving these memories for the next generation. As a young Upper Silesian woman recounted in the late 1950s: "foreign people live in our family house and in our village, but Schonowitz lives in memory as it was when we were still happy children."⁷² Through the first two decades of the Cold War, the growing awareness of a division between this idealized Silesia of memory and Silesia as it was transforming in western Poland convinced an increasing number of expellees that they could never return to live again in the East.⁷³

By the late 1950s, the cauldron of moving populations in Silesia had cooled and Warsaw relaxed some travel restrictions, enabling a few West Germans to visit Silesia and witness how Poles lived there now. Despite the short space of time, changes to the homeland were often extreme, leaving just a few traces as markers referring to former spaces of memory. Travelers' responses to the changes often relied upon age-old German bigotry about a supposedly inherent Polish "backwardness," summed up by the words *polnische Wirtschaft*, the idea that Poles were lazy and chaotic, incapable of ordering their affairs without German guidance. The persistence of this racism in the writing of the time, much of it drawing on pre-Nazi roots, is both widespread and disturbing. Changes in the old homeland were very often seen as inferior—nonetheless, they were accepted as implicitly irreversible, and this encouraged the desire to remember what had been and ultimately (usually without first intending it) to learn what Silesia had

become for its Polish residents. For most travelers, the discovery of the Polish settlers' human face proved an important step toward overcoming much of the old bigotry.⁷⁴

The word *tourist* seldom describes how these early travelers saw themselves.⁷⁵ After finding himself imprisoned in August 1945 at age sixteen for his role in a band of German insurgents, Gerhard Haupt suffered nine years of malnourishment in a Polish cell and three years of forced labor before he was finally granted permission to leave for West Germany in 1957. On his way through Lower Silesia, he stopped off in what had, in another lifetime, been his home in Siegersdorf (Zebrzydowa), near Bunzlau (Bolesławiec). Here, like most German travelers, he was overwhelmed by dramatic changes from what he remembered. Everything was empty, boarded-up and overgrown like a "a no-man's land.... I saw homes turned into animal stalls, collapsing fences, neglected fountains and ultimately found that, of the many shops that Siegersdorf once had, only two are still in service."⁷⁶ In place of Siegersdorf, he encountered a Polish village whose name he misspelled and whose streets he found dead.

After this first shock, Haupt started to interact with Polish settlers, who lived in the grim reality of Zebrzydowa and yearned to return home to Yugoslavia.⁷⁷ Here, the "dead" city acquired a human face: "These are people with good hearts. Each welcomed me in a friendly way, many complained of their suffering and that all the houses needed repair, but the people lacked materials through which they could bring the decay into order. Each of them yearns to go back to Yugoslavia and indulges us Germans in the return to the *Heimat*." When he expressed horror to his new associates at the overgrown, plundered cemeteries, "No one understood my indignation. They shrugged their shoulders. 'We don't care about it,' I heard, 'who knows where we will eventually go.'" By the time Haupt left that afternoon, he understood something of the Yugoslav Poles in Zebrzydowa and why it was that their world so little resembled what he remembered. When he wrote of his experience to his "beloved *Heimat* community" from Bunzlau county in its West German newspaper, he never called on them to demand Siegersdorf's return, nor did he demonize the poor souls who lived there now. For Haupt, claims about the former *Heimat* made by expelled political leaders would have been simply absurd; the Siegersdorf they had known was gone, real human beings lived in it as it was, and, deploying an interpersonal notion of *Heimat*, he concluded

with the hope that “these lines contribute to holding us together even more firmly in the deepest places in our hearts.”⁷⁸

At this point, one might justly inquire: to what extent can scholars trust these German sources as a window into contemporary Polish life in former German spaces? Is it not possible that travelers were documenting how Polish dissatisfaction was yielding desire for a reverse migration in order to underpin the West German expellees’ political agenda for territorial restitution? In response to this viewpoint, one must keep in mind that travelers themselves repeatedly expressed exasperation with the spaces they visited, a sense that there was no return to a homeland that no longer existed. Had they truly desired border revision, would they not have sought to portray the homeland as somehow salvageable? It should not be strange that they empathized with Polish yearning for return to memory spaces in Lwów or Wilno, because they also knew what it was to lose spaces of memory. When they walked the once-intimate lands of their former *Heimat*, the oppressive sense of change forced them to stop and close their eyes, to imagine what it once had been and know that this bygone (and idealized) world could not exist in the real world.

Amid accelerating reconstruction efforts during the early 1960s, homesick tourists often found themselves surrounded by signs that Silesia had become an integral economic and cultural player in postwar Poland, inhabited by generations with ever fewer memories of childhood surroundings in prewar Poland. When a Lower Silesian returned with his family to visit Lüben (Lubin) in September 1963, he was overwhelmed to find his path into the city “almost impossible, because there were hardly any streets left that had not been dug up. Construction equipment lay everywhere.” The cause, he learned, was the establishment of a new copper mine, which had even necessitated the creation of new rail lines. When they traveled to their old village nearby, they met the Poles who lived in their old house—a different family from the one that had moved in before their expulsion in 1947. “And the Poles who now live on our property welcomed us quite warmly, fed us, and were visibly disappointed when we couldn’t stay longer.” The experience proved so positive that they sent for a translator, a neighbor who had lived for thirty years in Zittau (a city now in East Germany), ensuring that the rest of their time there “could be used for animated conversation.”⁷⁹

Because Upper Silesia was not as badly damaged in the war and was still inhabited by an indigenous, often bilingual, minority, travelers returning to this region in the 1960s tended to be particularly struck by the inroads made by an ever more predominant Polish culture on those who remained (autochthons whom they interpreted as “Germans,” though historically their national identity had been uncertain).⁸⁰ On a trip back to Gleiwitz in 1960, a homesick tourist who had last seen his native town before leaving as a Wehrmacht soldier was “shaken” by how the city now bore “barely any similarity” to the image he had long treasured “in his heart.” Applying the usual anti-Polish bigotry (that the town had become “unclean” and “disordered”) without reference to the Cold War context (such as the fact that Poland was a much poorer country than West Germany), he nonetheless recognized that “Gleiwitz is overwhelmingly inhabited by Poles from the region around Lemberg [Lwów/Lviv], who now give the city its character.” In the midst of his unflattering portrayal of ruins and overgrown areas, his descriptions also included the construction of a technical university, the abundance of flowerbeds in the Polish national colors (red and white) in parks apparently cared for, and the construction of new apartment buildings. In the midst of this changing Polish city, he only felt at home among the dwindling “German” population that still lived in the suburbs.⁸¹ Another visitor to Gleiwitz noted in 1963 that “there now exists hardly any hate anymore by the Poles against the [Upper Silesian] Germans,” leading him to conclude that relations between Germans and Poles in general had improved. At the same time, however, he realized that the region was losing its remaining German features. Interacting in German with friends who had remained in Upper Silesia, he was told that Upper Silesian children spoke German only at home—among their classmates and in the street “the German language is being lost nonetheless.” In the face of the reality that the next generation was integrating into a Polish cultural milieu, he could only hope (in vain) that these children could still “think and feel as Germans.”⁸²

West German travel experiences before 1970 were regularly distributed in expellee periodicals devoted to former regional homelands and discussed at homeland gatherings; with the advent of better West German-Polish relations after the 1970 Treaty of Warsaw, the sheer magnitude of travel opportunities significantly expanded the chance for many thousands of Silesians to experience the former homeland for themselves. A cursory



Fig. 2. St. Vincent's Church, Wrocław (1971). Photo by Hubert Wolff, courtesy of the photographer.

look at a few representative cases from the many available published and unpublished accounts reveals a significant rise in German awareness that the former homeland was now part of Poland, home to real people struggling to survive in the much changed world that had once been the travelers' home. At the same time, Polish residents often encountered homesick tourists as guests uniquely informed about what their new home had once been; they proved particularly interested in discussing their present livelihood as well as the difficult past. Shared histories of residency in spaces with intimate meanings often led to the formation of friendships, even long-term bonds.

While Polish guides, maps and officials preached Piast myths that German Silesians never believed (though some non-Silesian German journalists were more credulous), travelers were usually willing to overlook the Polish reinscription of German sites of memory if, in the end, the Poles were willing to rebuild or repair German sites to their satisfaction, because it gave them a sense that memory spaces from their past were living on in the lives of other people. Like most returning Silesians, when Hubert Wolff traveled to his birthplace, Wrocław, in 1971 (figure 2), he was intolerant of anything smacking of "untruth." Though a Polish tour guide "alleged" with "pride" that the city hall had been totally rebuilt by

the Poles, Wolff was assured from reports he had read that it had been damaged only lightly. For all this, in the same line, he expressed particular appreciation for the “love and care” which the Poles had put into rebuilding the central marketplace surrounding the town hall.⁸³ Having visited her Silesian hometown on multiple occasions, Dorothea Tscheschner praised the Polish reconstruction of the castle in Brzeg (which her father, Brieg’s pre-Nazi chief architect, had wanted restored as a *Heimatmuseum*), even though the Poles had dedicated the castle to commemorating the Piast princes who had once lived there.⁸⁴

Heinrich Trierenberg, who by the end of the 1970s was regularly visiting Wrocław (the birthplace of his entire family), likewise proved quick to denounce nationalist overtones in reconstruction efforts which he, nonetheless, found generally tasteful. Looking to the spires of the city’s once-destroyed churches over the tops of modern structures on the New Market (figure 3), he extolled how, though “their reconstruction took place through a specific motivation, namely the Piast historical mythos, whose objective cannot justify claims for [Polish] possession, the result of the reconstruction is nonetheless pleasant.” So pleased was Trierenberg with Polish reconstruction of German sites of memory in Wrocław that he produced a series of “before and after” images in his book and applauded that “Here, as in numerous similar cases, something noteworthy is achieved, perhaps more than in some German cities after the war. Even those who mourn the loss of their homeland should recognize these efforts. By jointly treasuring the worth of Breslau’s citizens’ splendid cultural achievements, they could contribute to the reconciliation of the nations!”⁸⁵

While homesick tourists tended to savor Polish efforts to reconstruct German structures (albeit with Polish meanings), their most urgent goal was to seek out and dwell upon each and every original trace that remained from their own, highly personal pasts. Amid their search, the transformation of past memory spaces reinforced for them that the physical world they had known was lost forever; at the same time, they could not avoid encountering the region’s post-1945 history and inhabitants. Here it is useful to return to the Fürst von Hatzfeldt, who checked out of his dilapidated room at the Hotel Monopol on a bright morning in June 1973 and set off with his wife for Trachenberg, the onetime seat of his family’s princely estate. He came into town without any idea of what remained, and the village itself, “which we had been most overjoyed to



Fig. 3. The Wrocław New Market (1980). Photo by Heinrich Trierenberg, in idem, *Heimat Breslau: Bild einer deutschen Stadt im Spiegel der Geschichte. Bildband mit 216 Großfotos* (Mannheim: Adam Kraft Verlag, 1980), 240. Courtesy of Verlagshaus Würzburg.

see again, disappointed us greatly.” In place of the German Trachenberg he imagined, buildings on the marketplace were falling down or gone altogether, and on the eastern side, the Polish inhabitants had painted over a cherished German inscription, “Gott segne das ehrbare Handwerk” (God bless the respectable trade). In place of what he remembered as a groomed and magnificent family estate, Hatzfeldt parked beside crumbling walls inundated with what he claimed (in words tending toward old anti-Polish slurs) “can only be designated now as a primeval forest (*Urwald*).”⁸⁶

In some cases, homesick tourists anticipated the alienation they would feel in Silesia and undertook the journey precisely *because* they felt it would help them to find closure with loss. Before leaving for “old Silesia” from West Germany in August 1974 with her siblings, in-laws, children and a grandchild, Lise Gast worried about passports and border control, the difficulties expected in navigating a country where she did not know the language, and above all fear of the “shock” that was to come (*Angst vor der Erschütterung*). In a meld of memories and present-day observations, Gast’s journal gave way to full lament when she first looked upon her old home in Kamieniec Żąbkowicki (Camenz): “Oh Camenz, our garden, our house! It still stood. Nevertheless, I stared at it and couldn’t comprehend—and it was just the same for my sister. Before it was white,

now it is black. Not a little gray, but really deep black, as though it were painted over with coal. There was no little garden in front. Could *that* really be our house?”⁸⁷

As they sought out traces of the past, homesick tourists tended at first to insulate their minds with psychological barriers which largely disregarded the new Polish residents and meanings in Silesia. Whenever possible, Wolff got out of official trip events dedicated to learning about Poland so that he could hunt for traces of the old Breslau. When waiting in the overgrown square outside his old church in Trachenberg, Hatzfeldt found the Polish Pentecost Mass in progress to be a nuisance blocking his entry into the town’s surviving architectural monument: “the pastor’s housekeeper told us in poor German that the Mass would be over in half an hour, but it lasted almost two more hours, during which we waited and lost time.” Like many other travelers, he also became obsessed with salvaging a token “souvenir,” to physically extract whatever former meanings were yet possible before it was too late. In his hunt for any trace from the past on the hereditary grounds, eventually, “among all the ruins, by the entry to the chapel from the house, we found that there was still a coat of arms on the stone over the lintel, which we could not remember at all because this entrance had been especially poorly lit. And this stone from *anno* 1683 became our ‘souvenir!’”⁸⁸ This old stone doorway, which had contained so little meaning before, now became a last vestige so precious that Hatzfeldt set to scheming about how he could possibly dismantle it.

Like Hatzfeldt, Gast had also been more interested at first in examining the traces of structures she valued in her memories. When she first examined the façade of her grandfather’s office on the ground floor of his stately home, she was overwhelmed with how it differed from her memories. Gazing on the three sandstone steps which led up to the front door, she remembered how good they had smelt when they had been scrubbed every Saturday. She stepped under the lintel which had once read “German house and German land, protect us God with your strong hand!” Uncertain of what she would find, she entered the house, trembling at the inner certainty that Polish strangers lived inside.⁸⁹

In the end, an encounter with the present inhabitants was unavoidable, at times even irresistible, as homesick tourists like Gast put themselves in situations where an encounter was all but certain. While touring the ruins of his castle, Hatzfeldt was finally confronted by its new Polish resi-

dent and, as in many other accounts, this finally brought the surrounding inhabitants into the narrative as real actors in a contemporary environment that had become their home. “As we climbed back down out of the ruins and came onto the courtyard, a Pole came over carrying two milk cans. He greeted us and said that he could speak German. I asked him where he lived, to which he answered: in the horse stall.” Further conversation between the former and present lords of Trachenberg revealed that the Pole, a bricklayer from the Poznań region, had suffered imprisonment by the Nazis in Westphalia and had come here, into this shocking poverty, to find a new start. By the end of their discussion, the Pole (now humanized with his own name, Casimir) admitted that he had known that Hatzfeldt was the former owner, because people never came to inspect the overgrown ruins, much less a stranger driving a sleek Western car. It was a friendly exchange, remarkably candid, and it soon developed into collaboration on the very subject of the German traces that surrounded them. When Hatzfeldt suddenly happened upon the “bright idea” of asking whether his new companion might dismantle the surviving entryway to extract the precious keystone, Casimir agreed at once. When one considers how much more materially privileged Silesia’s visiting former residents were when compared to most settlers, it becomes all the more remarkable that the Poles seldom hindered Germans from taking memory tokens with them. They knew that the items would have greater meaning for the Germans, and all they asked for in exchange was a story: they wanted to know why these things had mattered. When Hatzfeldt returned the next day “punctually at three in the afternoon at the Crown Gate, Casimir stood there beaming and told us that he had broken off the stone with the coat of arms!”⁹⁰

Likewise, when Gast entered the state apartment building which had once been her grandfather’s business and home, she met a German woman who had married a Polish railway worker and become bilingual. Through “Frau Lenz,” she met other Polish occupants: “confused, curious, compassionate.” They had come from Galicia, “swept here in the great flood of peoples. They were also not at home here and yearned to go back.”⁹¹ Like the Steinauer back in 1948, the shared fate of expulsion bonded Gast and the Poles who had occupied her family home. But now, over twenty years later, the Polish population had grown more used to their new homes, while German memories of the lost land had become

more distant. Silesia's Galician settlers invited Gast and her fellow homesick tourists over for coffee the next day as guests.

Like Gast's new Polish acquaintances, Casimir took command of Hatzfeldt's visit by transforming himself into his host. Once they had the stone secured under the hood of Hatzfeldt's car, Casimir guided them to the home of a "Frau Ponsa and Pawlak" in Radungen (Radziadz), who, like Casimir, were very interested in hearing Hatzfeldt's story. At the newly built Ponsa homestead, "all at once, the Pawlak family, the pastor and about twenty people burst into the room, as well as Mrs. Stelmacek from Neudorf. And we all had so much to say that we could have remained there for hours." The Polish hosts had also discovered another pair of Germans touring the former homeland for the first time, two brothers who now lived in the GDR. They shared their stories as well, after which the pastor gave them all a tour of the village church and demonstrated that here the German graves had not been exhumed.⁹² So it was that, for some of the Poles in the Germans' path, German visitors became translators of past significances for the memory spaces they themselves were seeking to interpret around them; they sought to help the Germans find healing in their former homeland and learn about former meanings.

At the same time that encounters with the new inhabitants often generated new friendships, they also forced homesick tourists to confront the fact that the world they longed for only existed in their memories. Throughout her coffee hour with the Galician settlers in her grandfather's home in Kamieniec Ząbkowicki, Lise Gast felt caught between fond memories of the rooms around her and the awareness that they now belonged to someone else.

The people were very, very friendly. We were led into the room that had once been the dining room. It had been partitioned into three little rooms, which failed to convey the height and breadth that this grand room had once possessed. The hour of return in "our" house, something we had dreamed about for decades, isn't clear in my memory. I sat there as in a fever; only as in a blur and from a distance could I see and hear what was going on around me. The people, the Galicians, were really hospitable. They had set the table and brought us coffee in high, narrow glasses, of which they seemed very proud.

Though she drifted occasionally into feelings of distaste for the new inhabitants, who had failed to keep up the garden or the beauty of the house, she also knew such a thing would have been near impossible for impoverished people who shared the house with seven other families. “In the end,” she concluded,

we felt a strong bond with these poor people, which eliminated all of the bitterness at the outset. They had been thrown around by life, fate and war and lived constantly with the awareness that perhaps the next day they would be brushed aside again to some other place. They couldn’t do anything about the fact that things were as they were: that we returned here as fleeting guests in our family home, guests of people who are also homesick and would so love to go home.⁹³

They parted “in *Herzlichkeit*,” and were even given irises to place on the family grave.⁹⁴

Monika Taubitz and her friend Eva had a similar experience when they returned to the region around Kłodzko (Glatz) in 1972. They found the Polish family living in Eva’s family home to be very welcoming (figures 4 and 5). Early hesitations gave way to an extended exchange of meanings, and ultimately goods: Eva promised to send the Polish family’s daughter the blue jeans she so wanted from the West, and the daughter in turn bequeathed to Eva a small, blue stuffed animal from her childhood, which had been in the bedroom “enthroned on a pile of pillows.”⁹⁵

Ultimately, many homesick tourists came to hope that Poles would also find meaning in what had once been and carry this forward as part of a Polish Silesia. Whenever he found any surviving sculpture or structure, Trierenberg praised its connection to a seven-century German history and hoped that it would instill “Silesian” values of high culture and tolerance in the “descendants” (*Nachfahren*), which could apply just as easily to the Poles living within these Silesian spaces as to his own, German descendants in West Germany.⁹⁶ Because Wrocław could “no longer be addressed as Breslau,” because most of his childhood sites had been destroyed, Wolff concluded that there was much for the Poles “to build here in the coming years.”⁹⁷ When Gast bid her farewell to the *Heimat*, she felt certain that it was a space its new residents would *enjoy*. When upon her return to West Germany her old neighbors from Silesia inquired whether it might have been better *not* to go and see how the *Heimat* had changed, she

always answered with a strong “no”: through her journey, she had been able to witness that the “gray coating” over Silesia was beginning to fade; though the old *Heimat* held different meanings for its new inhabitants, it was “slowly beginning to shine again, turning colorful and splendid as it once was, perhaps even more beautiful.” Having spent almost thirty years “yearning and yearning to see it again,” the province remained her spiritual possession, as well as something possessed now by its present inhabitants on the other side of the border: “We carry our *Heimat* within us and all who know her behind the borders will do just the same. *Heimat* is something eternal, something which cannot be lost. We grasp it thankfully, if also with tears in our eyes. Doesn’t this offset all of the pain?”⁹⁸ By sharing Silesia with its present inhabitants, she felt alleviated from the pain of its physical loss.

Hatzfeldt had not hoped for an exchange with the Poles, but after the fact, the encounter left the strongest impression of all: “in Radungen, we had the most warm and friendly return experience (*herzlichste Wiedersehen*) of the entire trip, and we are very grateful to Casimir for taking it into his own hands to invite us.”⁹⁹ By the end of his first tour of Polish Silesia, Hatzfeldt was referring to the old family estate as “Dominum Schmiegrode,” a variation on the Polish name of Żmigród, and the Poles, utterly absent before the appearance of Casimir, came to dominate his account. He vowed that they would return and, rather than spend the night again at the decaying Hotel Monopol, they would find accommodation as “hunting guests” with the forest manager in a village near Żmigród, a onetime German now married to a Pole and running a Polish inn for all manner of visiting foreigners. Such a future opportunity for forging new connections with the homeland would grant, he planned, “time to see much more and attempt to further reconstruct an internal connection to the old *Heimat*, even amid what are now heavy and bitter conditions.”¹⁰⁰ Further travel had potential to alleviate the pain of loss and aid homesick tourists in coming to understand the culture which had come to dominate their old *Heimat*.

With the approaching extinction of the homesick tourists’ generation, the fleeting era of transnational exchange between Silesia’s former and present residents closes rapidly. Already in 1978, Sigismund Freiherr von Zedlitz predicted during his visit “home” to Liegnitz that, within twenty years, the growing cooperation and interchange between Ger-



Fig. 4. Eva at the house of her grandparents near Kłodzko (1972). Photo courtesy of Monika Taubitz.



Fig. 5. The Kober family, Polish settlers who lived in the former house of Eva's grandparents (1972). Photo courtesy of Monika Taubitz.

mans and Poles in Silesia would die out unless interest was instilled in younger Germans.¹⁰¹ Seven years ago, Dorothea Tscheschner decreed that this had in fact come to pass: those most capable of deciphering the Silesian palimpsest's fading German ink were vanishing from history at the same time that the Polish mythology of "recovered lands" declined and Polish-Silesian interest in the German past further increased.¹⁰² It is not hard to understand the despair Germany's last Silesians feel as they witness the final dissipation of their memories. With the death of the Fürst von Hatzfeldt and Lise Gast, the number of Germans that remember the former elegance of the Hotel Monopol dwindled still further. By the time the old art nouveau hotel opened its doors again in mid-2009 (after a full renovation which gutted much of the building), the traces speaking to the German past were yet fewer in number (figure 6). Today, German inscriptions no longer await discovery under painted switch panels, and Germans visiting on business or vacation are not looking for them. Without ties to the region, even most descendants of German Silesians are largely ignorant of the region's German past and dismiss *Śląsk* as just another area of a Poland that few Germans should care to visit. Germans are simply not Silesian anymore. Today's Silesians are Polish, and they take possession of their homeland's layered history on their own terms.

CONCLUSION

Whether from the scattershot destruction from bombs and bombardment or the willful erasure of a hammer and chisel over a tombstone inscription, the twentieth century transformed memory spaces across Europe and beyond. It recast Polish-Jewish Lwów into Ukrainian Lviv, German-Jewish Breslau into Polish Wrocław, Greek-Jewish Smyrna into Turkish Izmir.¹⁰³ It reinvented multiethnic cities as components within "homogenous" nation-states. It weathered away the written and rewritten meanings that had existed before, and new populations painted fresh palimpsest meanings in their place.

With the end of a brief era of engagement between Silesia's past and present inhabitants, and with the waning of the contrived, top-down reinscription of Silesia as a "recovered territory," the region has been transitioning for the past few decades into a new amalgam, in which



Fig. 6. The Hotel Monopol in 2009. Photo by author.

the Poles of Silesia interpret for themselves the fading texts beneath the palimpsest reinscription. Certainly new top-down initiatives—conferences, cultural centers and educational initiatives on both sides—seek to carry on the “bridge” in large part constructed by the previous generation’s exchange; but without German translators, the Poles of Silesia interpret and possess the former German layer in the palimpsest for themselves, so that the Silesian manuscript comes to resemble Polish texts with selective German features. Before the war, Lower Silesian Bunzlau was known as the *Stadt des guten Tones*, the “city of good clay.” Since the war, as the last Bunzlauer in West Germany commemorated their pottery’s past, Polish Bolesławiec continued and expanded the industry, to the point that contemporary Polish-Americans, Western Europeans and even most Germans have no awareness of this German heritage when they collect Bolesławiec’s “Polish pottery” (figure 7). Indeed, the melding of former German craft with Polish meanings has progressed so far that, next to stands of Russian Lomonosov porcelain and Matrioshka dolls, the gift shop at the Museum of Russian Art in South Minneapolis now sells a wide assortment of Polish pottery from Bolesławiec, the ideal keepsake



Fig. 7. *Bunzlauer Ton*, now Polish pottery from Boleslawiec. Photo by author.

for any visitor interested in buying “Slavic” artwork, even if it is written over clays once molded by Germans.

NOTES

I want to thank Matti Bunzl, George Gasyna, Rebecca Mitchell, the participants at the 2009 International Slavic Conference in Chicago, and the editors and anonymous reviewers from *History & Memory* for their thoughtful comments on drafts of this paper.

1. Fürsten von Hatzfeldt, *Bericht über die Fabrt nach Schlesien vom 9.–12. Juni 1973* (Cologne: n.p., 1973), 2.

2. Jan Gross first exposed the interdependence of wartime and postwar population movements in their methods and result (such as granting successor populations rapid upward mobility and more tolerance for extreme measures) in his “Social Consequences of War: Preliminaries to the Study of Imposition of Communist Regimes in East Central Europe,” *East European Politics and Societies* 3 (March 1989): 198–214.

3. Pierre Nora, “Between Memory and History: *Les Lieux de Mémoire*,” *Representations*, no. 26 (Spring 1989): 12.

4. Andreas Huyssen observes that urban spaces can become *palimpsests*. New meanings are written over the old, shaping collective imaginations and amnesias:

Present Pasts: Urban Palimpsests and the Politics of Memory (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), 7.

5. This essay responds to three alternate views, which seek to downplay 1938–48 as an unparalleled watershed of radical change. Norman Davies and Roger Moorhouse portray Silesia as a land of constant historical transformation in *Microcosm: Portrait of a Central European City* (London: Jonathan Cape, 2002), but the periodic change of rulers and multicultural interchange before 1945 cannot compare to the province's veritable reinvention after the near-complete shift of populations. Gregor Thum rightly emphasizes continuities between prewar and postwar Silesia in *Die fremde Stadt: Breslau 1945* (Munich: Siedler, 2003), 48. Yet even if (for example) early Wrocławian academics and politicians were fluent in German, they generally considered themselves to be Polish and fostered the city's Polonization. Zbigniew Mazur proposes 1989 as a change as important as 1945, because Poles were finally seeking a new relationship with the German past, in "Das deutsche Kulturerbe in den West- und Nordgebieten Polens," *Osteuropa* 47 (1997): 647. However, the breakthrough of official interest was long anticipated by the public, whose curiosity about former German meanings had grown through the previous decades before accelerating after 1989.

6. The term "recovered territories" first appeared during Poland's 1938 incursion into Czechoslovakia, when the state was said to have "recovered" territory near Cieszyn. To stop differentiating the former German lands from the rest of Poland, Poland's Stalinist rulers officially replaced "recovered territories" with "northern and western territories" in 1949, but the old phrase continued in everyday usage throughout the Cold War and even to this day. For examples of the reinscription of an ancient, "Piasz" Silesia, see contemporary scholarship such as Józef Kokot, *The Logic of the Oder-Neisse Frontier*, 2nd ed., trans. Andrzej Potocki (Poznań: Journalists' Cooperative, 1959); and Bohdan Gruchman et. al., eds., *Polish Western Territories* (Poznań: Instytut Zachodni, 1959).

7. Nora, "Between Memory and History," 9.

8. Padraic Kenney, "Polish Workers and the Stalinist Transformation," in Norman Naimark and Leonid Gibianskii, eds., *The Establishment of Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe, 1944–1949* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1997), 140.

9. Waves of anti-Semitism wracked Silesia's Jewish community through the medieval and early modern periods. By the nineteenth century, Breslau possessed the second-largest Jewish community in Prussia after Berlin. Till van Rahden analyzes this community's interaction with the surrounding German political, economic and cultural structure in *Juden und andere Breslauer* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 2000).

10. In *Niemcy w Polsce* (Germans in Poland) (Wrocław Wydawnictwo Dolnośląskie, 2001), Marek Zybura surveys the history of Germans in Poland and

places postwar atrocities against Germans, such as the massacre at Lamsdorf, into a broader historical context that includes German atrocities and settlement in Poland during World War II (93–207).

11. Marek Czapliński, ed., *Historia Śląska* (The history of Silesia) (Wrocław, 2002), 328–29; Maria Wanda Wanatowicz, *Historia społeczno-polityczna Górnego Śląska i Śląska Cieszyńskiego w latach 1918–1945* (The sociopolitical history of Upper Silesia and Teschen Silesia, 1918–1945) (Katowice: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, 1994), 12.

12. Polish National Democrats (rightwing nationalists also known as *Endeks*) dueled throughout the twentieth century with their highly comparable German *Ostforscher* counterparts, who produced expanding justifications for the German *Drang nach Osten* against Poland. Markus Krzoska has produced an excellent historiographic biography of a leading Polish nationalist historian, *Für ein Polen an Oder und Ostsee: Zygmunt Wojciechowski (1900–1955) als Historiker und Publizist* (Osnabrück, Fibre Verlag, 2003), which is well paired with Eduard Mühle's biography of a leading anti-Slavic scholar, *Für Volk und deutschen Osten: Der Historiker Hermann Aubin und die deutsche Ostforschung* (Düsseldorf: Droste, 2005). Important critical studies of *Ostforschung* include Michael Burleigh, *Germany Turns Eastwards: A Study of Ostforschung in the Third Reich* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988); and Ingo Haar and Michael Fahlbusch eds., *German Scholars and Ethnic Cleansing, 1919–1945* (New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2005).

13. Günther Doose, *Die separatistische Bewegung in Oberschlesien nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg, 1918–1922* (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1987); Marek Czapliński, ed., *Historia Śląska* (The history of Silesia) (Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, 2002), 296.

14. For the importance of economic considerations, see Waldemar Grosch's analysis of plebiscite placards and campaigns in *Deutsche und polnische Propaganda während der Volksabstimmung in Oberschlesien, 1919–1921* (Dortmund: Forschungsstelle Ostmitteleuropa, 2002). For the importance of Catholicism in framing national indifference, see James Bjork, *Neither German nor Pole: Catholicism in a Central European Borderland* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2008).

15. In this manner, as Beata Ocieпка demonstrates, the Polish regime sought to demonstrate that the “recovered territories” were in fact home to an ancient Polish population. See *Niemcy na Dolnym Śląsku w latach 1945–1970* (Germans in Lower Silesia, 1945–1970) (Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, 1992), 6. Both the German and then Polish population projects illustrate the power of modern bureaucratic efficiency when wedded to modern nationalist and racial ideologies, which had no comparable precedent in Silesia's history of multiethnic exchange. See Michael Esch, “*Gesunde Verhältnisse*”: *Deutsche und*

polnische Bevölkerungspolitik in Ostmitteleuropa 1939–1950 (Marburg: Herder Institut, 1998), 48, 58, 408.

16. For a detailed depiction of many facets of early postwar life in Wrocław (political structures, reconstruction, worker culture, Jewish life, the departure of Germans, etc.), see Marek Ordyłowski, *Życie codzienne we Wrocławiu, 1945–1948* (Everyday life in Wrocław, 1945–1948) (Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im Ossolińskich, 1991).

17. See Peter Fritzsche's theory that, after immense trauma, nostalgia can become social, as some of those affected seek to restore a lost sense of wholeness: "How Nostalgia Narrates Modernity," in Alon Confino and Peter Fritzsche, eds., *The Work of Memory* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2002), 62–85.

18. That these three groups collaborated, despite their significant mistrust of one another, in order to achieve the nationalist goals in Poland's "recovered territories" has been well-documented in recent studies, most notably T. David Curp, *A Clean Sweep?: The Politics of Ethnic Cleansing in Western Poland, 1945–1960* (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2006).

19. Marek Zybur, *Der Umgang mit dem deutschen Kulturerbe in Schlesien nach 1945*, *Impressionen aus der Kulturlandschaft Schlesien 3* (Görlitz: Senfkorn Verlag Alfred Theisen, 2005), 15.

20. Brian Porter, *When Nationalism Began to Hate: Imagining Modern Politics in Nineteenth-Century Poland* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 5.

21. Grzegorz Strauchold, "Die Wiedergegewonnen Gebiete und das 'Piastische Schlesien,'" in Marek Czapliński and Tobias Weger, eds., *Schlesische Erinnerungs-orte: Gedächtnis und Identität einer mitteleuropäischen Region* (Görlitz: Neißer Verlag, 2005), 306. See also Strauchold's examination of ways in which Polish societies promulgated the "western idea" in idem, *Mysł zachodnia i jej realizacja w Polsce ludowej w latach 1945–1957* (The western idea and its realization in the Polish people, 1945–1957) (Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, 2003).

22. See, for example, Marian Seyda, *Poland and Germany and the Post-War Reconstruction of Europe* (London: Published for Private Circulation, September 1942).

23. As Karin Friedrich and Klaus Zernack observe, "with its traditional interest in the history of eastern Germany, Polish historiography was aggressively and unstintingly placed in the service of *raison d'état* only after the Second World War, in the wake of the establishment of the new western border. Great efforts were made to explain and justify the actual changes in the Polish state territory in the west from a historical [Piaśt] perspective." See their article, "Developments in Polish Scholarship on German History, 1945–2000," *German History* 22, no. 3 (2004): 313.

24. Quoted in Zyburka, *Der Umgang mit dem deutschen Kulturerbe*, 12. These proclamations were ubiquitous, as in the “Appeal from the Central Resettlement Committee,” quoted in Thum, *Die fremde Stadt*, 120.

25. S. L. Schneiderman, *Between Fear and Hope* (New York: Arco Publishing Company, 1947), 245–46. This is in keeping with the work of T. David Curp. Because a majority voted in favor of the new borders in the “three times yes” referendum meant to prove the regime’s popularity, Curp has contended that the border issue made Poles willing to remain indifferent to the decimation of political pluralism. See *A Clean Sweep*, 69, 78–79; see also Thum, *Die fremde Stadt*, 38.

26. For an example of Western Poles’ demands for both the “recovered territories” and the lost *kresy*, see “Resolution: Adopted by the Executive Board of the Polish American Congress on March 9, 1945,” in *Polish American Congress, 1944–1948: Selected Documents* (Chicago: Polish American Congress, 1948), 36. Because it was forbidden to mention the *kresy* (and therefore that the new lands were compensation for territories lost to the Soviets in the East), it became that much more important for leaders to emphasize that the western lands were simply being returned to their rightful owners. Jakub Tyszkiewicz, “Communist Propaganda in the German Provinces Ceded to Poland,” in Zdenko Čepič, ed., *1945—A Break with the Past: A History of Central European Countries at the End of World War Two* (Ljubljana: Institute of Contemporary History, 2008), 95.

27. Józef Feldman and Zygmunt Wojciechowski, “Poland and Germany—The Last Ten Years,” in Zygmunt Wojciechowski, ed., *Poland’s Place in Europe*, trans. B. W. A. Massey (Poznań: Instytut Zachodni, 1947), 324, 358, 412. Another foundational work was Wojciechowski’s brochure *Rozwój terytorialny Prus w stosunku do ziem maciewrzystych Polski* (Prussia’s territorial development with respect to Poland’s ancient lands) (Toruń, n.p., 1933), which argued that Poland’s Prussian-induced backwardness could only be overcome through the “return” of allegedly ancient territories in Silesia and Pomerania. For more on Wojciechowski’s critical leadership role as the West Institute’s first director and Dmowski’s successor, see Krzoska, *Für ein Polen an Oder und Ostsee*, 331.

28. Maria Kielczewska Zaleska, “The Geographical Bases of Poland,” in Wojciechowski, ed., *Poland’s Place in Europe*, 12; Tadeusz Lehr-Splawiński, “The Origin and Ancestral Home of the Slavs,” in *ibid.*, 78.

29. For one among many examples, see Gruchman et al., *Polish Western Territories*, 6. The TRZZ brought together more than 3,000 local groups and 150,000 members and tapped annual funds which, by 1960, had reached about eleven million *złoty*. Rudolf J. Neumann, *Polens Westarbeit: Die Polnischen Kultur- und Bildungs-Einrichtungen in den deutschen Ostgebieten* (Bremen: Carl Schünemann Verlag, 1966), 169. As Curp has observed, this “popularized a party-state that was increasingly nationalist in content and socialist in form,” drawing “Polish atten-

tion to foreign threats abroad and within and emphasiz[ing] the need for Polish unity: a rhetorical truncheon with which to beat any would-be opposition.” See T. David Curp, “‘Roman Dmowski Understood’: Ethnic Cleansing as Permanent Revolution,” *European History Quarterly* 35, no. 3 (July 2005): 413–14.

30. Juliane Haubold-Stolle, *Mythos Oberschlesien: Der Kampf um die Erinnerung in Deutschland und in Polen* (Osnabrück: Fibre Verlag, 2008), 324. This work also traces how the “western idea” lived onward in the idea of the “recovered territories.”

31. Quoted in Zybura, *Der Umgang mit dem deutschen Kulturerbe*, 15.

32. In his June 1, 1997, speech at the 46th annual International Eucharistic Congress held in Wrocław, the pope went so far as to refer to the city as “situated practically at the meeting point of three lands which through their history are very closely united to one another. It is, as it were, a city of encounter, a city that unites.” “Homily of Pope John Paul II” (June 1, 1997), <http://www.fjp2.com/us/john-paul-ii/online-library/homilies/2026--46th-international-eucharistic-congress> (accessed August 13, 2011).

33. *German-Polish Dialogue: Letters of the Polish and German Bishops and International Statements* (Bonn, Brussels and New York: Edition Atlantic-Forum, 1966).

34. This phenomenon also entered into the observations of German travelers such as Willi Michael Beutel, “1500 km durch Niederschlesien: ein Reisebericht,” in Johannes Seipolt, ed., *Das Heutige Schlesien*, vol. 2, *Niederschlesien, ein Tatsachen und Reisebericht in Wort und Bild* (Munich: Aufstieg-Verlag, 1957), 16; and Karl Lerch, ed., *Jenseits von Oder und Neisse: Wie sieht es im deutschen Osten aus? Bilder und Berichte aus Niederschlesien, Oberschlesien, Ostpreußen, Westpreußen, Danzig, und Pommern* (Tübingen: Verlag Südwest-Presse, 1957), 9.

35. Gregor Thum, “Cleansed Memory: The New Polish Wrocław/Breslau and the Expulsion of the Germans,” in Terry Hunt Tooley and Stevan Béla Várdy, eds., *Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe*, Social Science Monographs (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 347.

36. “Aufnahmen: Gräberfürsorge für das In- und Ausland, München 13,” Bundesarchiv in Koblenz (hereafter BAK), B 137/1280. The cemetery was preserved for use by the city’s new Jewish population, which had no connection to the prewar community.

37. Wanda Roszkowska, *A Guide to Wrocław*, trans. Krystyna Kozłowska and Helena Massey (Warszawa: Sport i Turystyka Publications, 1970), 136–37. For more on postwar Poland’s troubled relationship to its Jewish population, see Jan Gross, *Fear: Anti-Semitism in Poland after Auschwitz. An Essay in Historical Interpretation* (New York: Princeton University Press, 2006).

38. Zbigniew Rowski, "Um die Entpreussung der Architektur der Westgebiete," in Deutsches Büro für Friedensfragen, ed., *Ausgewählte Berichte aus polnischen und tschechischen Zeitungen und Zeitschriften über die deutschen Ostgebiete und das Sudetenland*, vol. 4 (Stuttgart: Deutsches Büro für Friedensfragen, September 1949), 12–13 (translated from *Odra* [Katowice], no. 7, March 8, 1949).

39. It is not unusual for foreigners to apply names which do not coincide with those in use by a city's residents. Much as to this day Poles call Dresden *Dresno*, Germans call Warszawa *Warschau*, and English-speakers call it *Warsaw*, Poles before 1945 had referred to German Breslau as Wrocław. In fact, both words shared a common root "Wratislavia," which commemorated the medieval Czech Duke Vratislav, who founded the city as a fortified outpost. Though Bunzlau was founded by Polish Prince Bolesław the Tall in 1190, it was totally rebuilt and resettled by German settlers after its destruction by the Mongols in 1240. It was not referred to as "Boleslawiec" by its inhabitants until its population changed amid the ethnic cleansing in the aftermath of World War II.

40. "Geheimes Schreiben des Chefs der Abteilung für Organisation und Lehrausbildung in der Hauptverwaltung des Amtes für Politische Erziehung der Polnischen Armee, Oberst Neugebauer, an das Ministerium für die Wiedergewonnenen Gebiete betreffend die schlechte Verpflegung der Umsiedler und Fehler bei ihrer Verteilung," January 31, 1946, in Stanisław Ciesielski, ed., *Umsiedlung der Polen aus den ehemaligen polnischen Ostgebieten nach Polen in den Jahren 1944–1947*, Quellen zur Geschichte und Landeskunde Ostmitteleuropas 6 (Marburg and Wrocław: Herder Institut, 2006), 464; "Vertrauliches Schreiben des Leiters der PUR-Wojewodschaftsabteilung in Kraków/Krakau, Ludwik Sowiński, an den Direktor des PUR zu den Vorwürfen gegen die Tätigkeit der PUR-Abteilung in Wrocław/Breslau," January 23, 1946, in *ibid.*, 462; "Schreiben des Direktors des Staatlichen Repatriierungsamtes, Michał Sapicha, an den Hauptbevollmächtigten der Regierung der RP für Umsiedlungsangelegenheiten in der USSR betreffend die Entsendung von Umsiedlern aus der USSR, die bei Kurorten gelebt haben," August 2, 1945, in *ibid.*, 358; "Schreiben der Wojewodschaftsabteilung des PUR in Katowice/Kattowitz an die Wojewodschaftsbehörde für Öffentliche Sicherheit betreffend den Schutz von Umsiedlertransporten," July 18, 1945, in *ibid.*, 342. This collection from major Warsaw archives (the State Repatriation Office [PUR], the General Empowerment of the Polish Republic's Government for Repatriation Concerns [GPRR], and the Archive of New Acts [AAN]) features a massive documentation about the resettlement of Poles and Ukrainians from the *kresy* into regions of the former German East. First completed in the original language in 1999 by leading Polish specialists (including Stanisław Ciesielski, Włodzimierz Borodziej and Jerzy Kochanowski) as *Przesiedlenie ludności polskiej z Kresów Wschodnich do Polski, 1944–1947*, it was then translated into German through

support from the Willy Brandt Center in Wrocław, the Robert Bosch Foundation and the Herder Institut in Marburg.

41. Emil Kaliski, "Wrocław wrócił do Polski" (Wrocław returned to Poland), *Skarpa Warszawska*, March 3, 1946, 4–5, quoted in Thum, "Cleansed Memory," 350.

42. Quoted in Zyburka, *Der Umgang mit dem deutsche Kulturerbe*, 19, 13.

43. Stanisław Lorentz, "Reconstruction of the Old Town Centers of Poland," in National Trust for Historic Preservation, ed., *Historic Preservation Today: Essays presented to the Seminar on Preservation and Restoration, Williamsburg, Virginia, September 8–11, 1963* (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1966), 47, 70.

44. Turpin Bannister, response to Lorentz, in *ibid.*, 78 (my emphasis); George Mosse, response to Lorentz, in *ibid.*, 75.

45. Zyburka, *Der Umgang mit dem deutschen Kulturerbe*, 22.

46. Davies and Moorhouse, *Microcosm*, 447. This structure is now on the UNESCO world heritage list. Similarly, an exhibition devoted to propagating a mythology about Silesia's ancient ties to Poland came to Wrocław's historical museum in 1948 and traveled throughout Poland afterwards. "Urgeschichte Schlesiens," in Deutsches Büro für Friedensfragen, ed., *Ausgewählte Berichte aus polnischen und tschechischen Zeitungen und Zeitschriften über die deutschen Ostgebiete und das Sudetenland*, vol. 12 (Stuttgart, May 1950): 17–20; cited from *Rzeczpospolita* (Warsaw), no. 43, February 12, 1950.

47. This included Ukrainians transplanted through *Akcja Wisła* in 1947. For statistics and the waves of resettlement in the *kresy*, see Stanisław Ciesielski, "Introduction," in *idem*, ed., *Umsiedlung der Polen*, 1–75. See also Andreas Hofmann, *Die Nachkriegszeit in Schlesien: gesellschafts- und Bevölkerungspolitik in den polnischen Siedlungsgebieten 1945–1948* (Cologne: Böhlau, 2000).

48. For example, in summer 1945 at Legnica, the Russians confiscated the harvest for their new military headquarters but forced impoverished Polish settlers from the East to work in the fields. See "Protokoll einer Konferenz der Abteilungsleiter in der Zentralverwaltung des PUR zum Verlauf der Umsiedlungsaktion und zur Lage der in die Westgebiete Umgesiedelten," July 21, 1945, in Ciesielski, ed., *Umsiedlung der Polen*, 348. Even in January 1946, it was reported that settlers from the East near Legnica consumed only a "bowl of black, bitter coffee" in the morning and evening, accompanied by "200 grams of black bread and a soup without almost any fat content" each day for lunch. See "Geheimes Schreiben des Chefs der Abteilung für Organisation und Lehrausbildung in der Hauptverwaltung des Amtes für Politische Erziehung der Polnischen Armee, Obers Neugebauer, an das Ministerium für die Wiedergewonnenen Gebiete betreffend die schlechte Verpflegung der Umsiedler und Fehler bei ihrer Verteilung," in *ibid.*, 465.

49. German travelers in the 1950s and 1960s were repeatedly amazed by the prevalence of goats in Szczecin or Wrocław, as former rural dwellers from the *kresy* now settled in a big city. See, for example, Ulrich Blank, *Zwischen Breslau und Danzig: Deutsche Heimat im Osten Heute* (Hanover: Fackelträger Verlag, 1958), 87; Johannes Seipolt, ed., *Das Heutige Schlesien*, vol. 1, *Breslau, ein Tatsachen und Reisebericht in Wort und Bild* (Munich: Aufstieg-Verlag, 1957), 80; Karl Lerch, *Jenseits von Oder und Neiße: Wie sieht es im deutschen Osten aus? Bilder und Berichte aus Niederschlesien, Oberschlesien, Ostpreußen, Westpreußen, Danzig, und Pommern* (Tübingen: Verlag Südwest-Presse, 1957), 12–13.

50. Ciesielski, "Introduction," 11.

51. K.S. Karol, *Visa for Poland*, trans. Mervyn Savill (London: MacGibbon and Kee, 1959), 8.

52. Padraic Kenney, *Rebuilding Poland: Workers and Communists, 1945–1950* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), 165, 183–84.

53. "Polish Bishops' Appeal to their German Colleagues," in *German-Polish Dialogue*, 14–15.

54. Mazur, "Das deutsche Kulturerbe in den West- und Nordgebieten Polens," 634; see also his monograph concerning Polish settlement patterns in former German regions, *Wspólne dziedzictwo? Ze studiów nad stosunkiem do spuścizny kulturowej na Ziemiach Zachodnich i Północnych* (Joint heirs? A study on the relation to the cultural heritage in the western and northern lands) (Poznań: Instytut Zachodni, 2000). As Zybura also records, settlers "did not possess their mythic fatherland, as argued in the propaganda, but rather a tactile 'foreign-land.' Everything was foreign there: the landscapes, aesthetics, cultivated layers of symbolism, cultural fabric, forms and levels of industrialization, as well as agricultural processes, and also the regional history" (*Der Umgang mit dem deutschen Kulturerbe*, 9).

55. Mazur, "Das deutsche Kulturerbe in den West- und Nordgebieten Polens," 647.

56. As David Lowenthal has observed, once the "bulldozer of change" has swept through remembered spaces, human beings contrive to "shape landscapes and artifacts to conform with illusory histories, public and private, that gratify our tastes." "Past Time, Present Place: Landscape and Memory," *Geographical Review* 65, no. 1 (January 1975): 36. Similarly, a recent, Silesian application of Pierre Nora's theories demonstrated that widespread physical destruction of memory spaces enhances their symbolic function, making them still more mythical than substantive in the minds of those who idealized or invented their meaning. See Czapliński and Weger, eds., *Schlesische Erinnerungsorte*, 7–8.

57. Bernard Linek, "Deutsche und polnische nationale Politik in Oberschlesien 1922–1989," in Kai Struve and Philipp Ther, eds., *Die Grenzen der Nationen: Identitätenwandel in Oberschlesien in der Neuzeit* (Marburg: Herder-Institut, 2002),

137–68; Philipp Ther, “Schlesisch, deutsch oder polnisch? Identitätenwandel in Oberschlesien 1921–1956,” in *ibid.*, 169–202.

58. Zybura, *Der Umgang mit dem deutschen Kulturerbe*, 9–10.

59. Mazur, “Das deutsche Kulturerbe in den West- und Nordgebieten Polens,” 639.

60. Joanna Konopińska, *Tamtem Wrocławski rok* (A year of Wrocław) (Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Dolnośląskie, 1987), 53, quoted in Thum, “Cleansed Memory,” 337. Discomfort among displaced Poles inhabiting prewar German homes also appears in the broadly circulated fiction of Stefan Chwin, who was born in immediate postwar Gdańsk/Danzig. See his *Death in Danzig*, trans. Philip Boehm (Orlando: Harcourt Books, 2004).

61. Henryka Wolna, “Integracje: Ostatni powrót miasta” (Integration: The recent return of the city), *Słowo Powszechne*, October 1, 1964, 1. Of course, this account may also have been influenced by the regime’s stance that integration of the new territories into Poland had been successful.

62. Grzegorz Strauchold, *Wrocław okazjonalna stolica Polski: wokół powojennych obchodów rocznic historycznych* (Wrocław as the occasional capital of Poland: Concerning postwar historical anniversary celebrations) (Wrocław: Wydanie Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, 2003), 17; “Rundlass Nr. 11 des Direktors des PUR, Michał Sapicha,” in Ciesielski, ed., *Umsiedlung der Polen*, 253.

63. Strauchold, “Die Wiedergewonnen Gebiete und das ‘Piastische Schlesien,’” 312–14. T. David Curp, Padraic Kenney and Krystyna Kersten have added further reasons for why the “recovered territories” made ordinary Poles more complicit with Poland’s dependence on Moscow and its communist agenda. Poles liked the idea that, after the losses of the difficult war years, they could take “back” German goods and property for themselves. Uprootedness and unprecedented social mobility “bound” them to an unprecedented social system that doled out a great deal of the wealth in spaces without older connections. Curp, *A Clean Sweep?*; Kenney, “Polish Workers and the Stalinist Transformation”; Kersten, *The Establishment of Communist Rule in Poland, 1943–1948*, trans. John MicGiel and Michael H. Bernhard (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991).

64. Thum, *Die fremde Stadt*, 42; Zybura, *Der Umgang mit dem deutschen Kulturerbe*, 20. Since the end of communism, the newly recognized “German minority” in Upper Silesia has even been allowed to create bilingual street names and city signs. Zybura, *Niemcy w Polsce*, 224.

65. See for example Gregor Thum, “Breslau und die ‘Stunde Null’: Kontinuität und Diskontinuität einer mitteleuropäischen Stadtgeschichte,” in Krzysztof Ruchniewicz, ed., *Geschichte Schlesiens im 20. Jahrhundert in den Forschungen junger Nachwuchswissenschaftler aus Polen, Tschechen und Deutschland* (Wrocław: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 1998), 202.

66. Kenney, "Polish Workers and the Stalinist Transformation," 144.

67. Andrew Demshuk, "'When you come back, the mountains will surely still be there!' How Silesian Expellees Processed the Loss of Their Homeland in the Early Postwar Years, 1945–1949," *Zeitschrift für Ostmitteleuropaforschung* 57, no. 2 (2008), 159–86.

68. A Steinauer, "Aus der alten Heimat," in Superintendent Gawel, *Steinauer Heimatbote*, September 5, 1948, Evangelisches Zentralarchiv—Zeitschriften 1006, 2.

69. Leo Machinek, "Ein Wort des Heimatpfarrers zu Weihnachten und zum Jahreswechsel," Christmas 1947, BAK Z 18/218, 11.

70. Leo Machinek, Pastoral Letter 4, mid-March 1948, BAK Z 18/218, 12.

71. Newspapers and pamphlets also disseminated evidence of the reinscription underway in the former East. In his 1949 book, *Aus Breslau wurde Wrocław* (Hannover: Verlag Wolfgang Kwiecinski, 1949), Breslauer Franz Otto Jerrig argued that two worlds had come into existence: a living, Polish Wrocław on top of a dead, German Breslau now accessible only in memory (7). Yet, though Jerrig recognized Wrocław as a city rebuilt by Poles for Poles, rather than Germans, he had no patience for the Polish myth of "recovered territories," emphasizing that German language and culture had dominated Lower Silesia by the fifteenth century, and Poland had already renounced the region a century before (54, 25).

72. Hilde Riegel-Kallabis, "Meine Eltern, Ein Erinnerungsblatt," in *Vermächtnis der Lebenden: Oberschlesien erzählen* (Augsburg: Oberschlesischer Heimatverlag, 1959–1962), 2:115.

73. This process of dealing with loss is examined in greater detail in Andrew Demshuk, *The Lost German East: Forced Migration and the Politics of Memory, 1945–1970* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

74. In this manner, exposure to the former German East brought expellees into contact with the old bigotries about Poles and Poland and often forced them to confront them. For a further example of *polnische Wirtschaft* in German imagination of the East, see David Blackbourn, *The Conquest of Nature: Water, Landscape, and the Making of Modern Germany* (London and New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2006).

75. As also shown in recent scholarship on East Bloc tourism, West German "homesick tourists" east of the Iron Curtain also demonstrated that they possessed their own agency when engaging with foreign spaces whose meaning was dictated by top-down authorities. See the general consensus about tourism as active engagement in Diane Koenker and Anne Gorsuch, eds., *Tourism: The Russian and East European Tourist under Capitalism and Socialism* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2006).

76. Gerhard Haupt, "Zerfall in Siegersdorf: Vernagelte Häuser, Trümmer und Schutt, aber Menschen mit guten Herzen," *Bunzlauer Heimat-Zeitung* 6, no. 16 (1957): 5–6.

77. In a little-known episode of the postwar population migrations, the Polish ambassador to Yugoslavia and Yugoslav deputy foreign minister signed an agreement in January 1946 through which a "voluntary" emigration of Poles in Yugoslavia could proceed, with Yugoslav Poles forfeiting citizenship and property in Yugoslavia in return for promises that some recompense would be channeled through the Polish government. Apparently, many of them ended up on deteriorating German estates in Silesia. "Protocol between the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and the Polish Republic concerning the Emigration of Poles from Yugoslavia. Signed at Belgrade on 2. January 1946," United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 115 (1951): 30–34.

78. Haupt, "Zerfall in Siegersdorf," 6.

79. H.G., "Ein 'Ossiger' war jetzt daheim!" *Liegnitzer Heimatbrief* 15, no. 23, December 10, 1963, 361.

80. In Poland's 2002 census, the largest minority identified itself, not as German, but as "Silesian." Bjork, *Neither German nor Pole*, 267.

81. "Ein klein wenig über das jetzige Gleiwitz," *Gleiwitzer, Beuthener, Tarnowitzer Heimatblatt* 10, no. 7 (July 1960): 36–38.

82. In the face of the fading German aspects he imagined, the traveler demonstrated a considerable lack of hope for any future border revision. When his Upper Silesian friends asked whether in time circumstances might change (that Upper Silesia might return to Germany), "I could merely say that change could only be brought about by a peace conference and that until then they possess German citizenship and are seen by West Germany as Germans." He knew that, nearly twenty years after the war, a peace conference was unlikely, and border revision virtually impossible. Only in West Germany did Upper Silesians retain their German identity. J. K., "Wiedersehen mit Gleiwitz," *Gleiwitzer, Beuthener, Tarnowitzer Heimatblatt* 13, no. 5 (May 1963): 27–28.

83. Hubert A. Wolff, "Reisebericht," unpublished manuscript, October 23, 1971, 2a (a copy is in the author's possession).

84. Dorothea Tscheschner, *Brieg: Bauten erzählen: Eine schlesische Perle* (Berlin: Dorothea Tscheschner Eigenverlag, 2004). The Piast princes had been Germanized in a German-speaking city long before they died out in 1675.

85. Heinrich Trierenberg, *Heimat Breslau: Bild einer deutschen Stadt im Spiegel der Geschichte: Bildband mit 216 Großfotos* (Mannheim: Adam Kraft Verlag, 1980), 240, 239.

86. Hatzfeldt, *Bericht über die Fahrt nach Schlesien*, 5.

87. Lise Gast, *Heimat hinter Grenzen: Eine Fahrt ins alte Schlesien* (Heilbronn: Eugen Salzer, 1975), 7, 49 (emphasis in original). Pregnant with her eighth child, Gast had fled Silesia in January 1945, lived through the firebombing of Dresden and then discovered that her husband had died in a prisoner-of-war camp in Czechoslovakia. Despite this, she managed to become a noted postwar author and raised ponies in West Germany. Three of the children who accompanied her in 1974 had been eleven, ten and nine at the time of the flight, and so sustained childhood memories of Silesia.

88. Hatzfeldt, *Bericht über die Fahrt nach Schlesien*, 5–6.

89. Gast, *Heimat hinter Grenzen*, 49–50.

90. Hatzfeldt, *Bericht über die Fahrt nach Schlesien*, 5–6.

91. Gast, *Heimat hinter Grenzen*, 51.

92. Hatzfeldt, *Bericht über die Fahrt nach Schlesien*, 11.

93. Gast, *Heimat hinter Grenzen*, 63–65 (emphasis in original).

94. *Ibid.*, 60, 69–70.

95. Monika Taubitz, *Schlesien—Tagebuch einer Reise* (Heidenheim: Jerratsch, 1972), 48, 52–53.

96. Trierenberg, *Heimat Breslau*, 22.

97. Wolff, “Reisebericht,” 1, 3a.

98. Gast, *Heimat hinter Grenzen*, 100–101.

99. Hatzfeldt, *Bericht über die Fahrt nach Schlesien*, 11.

100. *Ibid.*, 12.

101. Konrad-Sigismund Freiherr von Zedlitz und Neukirch, “Liegnitz heute,” in Historische Gesellschaft Liegnitz, ed., *Liegnitz: Bilder aus der Geschichte einer schlesischen Stadt von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart* (Lorch and Württemberg: Gerhard Weber Verlag, 1979), 91–92.

102. Tscheschner, *Brieg*, 8.

103. For an excellent examination of Salonika as a Greek-Jewish-Turkish palimpsest, see Mark Mazower, *Salonika: City of Ghosts: Christians, Muslims, and Jews, 1430–1950* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 2005).