Studies of industrial labor forces have generally tended to emphasize the development of trade union organizations. Marxists, anti-Marxists and self-proclaimed neutrals have seen in such groupings the key to understanding the behavior of industrial workers. Even in cases where unions were weak, as in France before 1914, or where they were short-lived or even nonexistent, such as in Germany in the 1870s and 1880s or in Russian Poland in the 1890s and after, unions have remained the focal point of study. Thus, where there were no unions or weak unions, writers have looked for explanations for their nonexistence, the assumption being that industrial workers will gravitate inexorably toward union organization at any given stage of industrial development; if they do not do so, they are “backward.”

A number of historians have heightened misunderstanding by simplistically viewing labor relations in an industrializing society as a struggle of the meritorious socialist labor unions against evil employers and against other unions subverted by false consciousness. To be sure, an open commitment to the righteousness of the workers’ cause does not necessarily undercut a historical study, as is obvious from the value of the work of E. P. Thompson on the English working class. What is important, however, is to avoid focusing on the labor union as the sole standard by which to measure the character of industrial workers’ life and as the unique avenue of legitimate labor protest. Instead, we must investigate the wider area of “working conditions,” broadly conceived, against the background of cyclical and structural economic and technological change in order to understand how labor and management

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have come to work out their mutual relationships in industrialized countries.

This is not to deny the important role of unions in creating a new consciousness among workers, possibly leading to a class consciousness in a Marxist sense, or in forming the nucleus of any movement of self-identification by industrial workers. However, in many cases unions have not developed at all, and there have been other situations where emphasis on unions has led to neglect of other forms of labor-management relations prior to the appearance of durable trade unions. Even where scholars have gone back to the first emergence of industry and industrial labor, many have tended to emphasize strikes or rudimentary forms of worker organization as adumbrations of later, more obvious organized worker activity.3

The continued reorientation of our thinking about labor protest can shed light on the way workers and employers played their roles in a production process.4 Labor-management relations then appear not merely as adversary proceedings but as a learning process for both groups in a total industrial context. Instead of regarding various kinds of industrial behavior like high rates of turnover and absenteeism as irrational manifestations of an anti-industrial animus, I contend here that one would be justified in looking for some kind of rationality in human behavior before introducing perhaps unjustified psychological assumptions about workers’ dissatisfaction with their jobs. Too often only employers are credited with economic realism, as when they hold down wages and stretch out the work day in recession periods; however, rising rates of job turnover in Upper Silesian mining and smelting in periods of business prosperity indicate a similar goal-oriented behavior on the part of workers.5

With these observations in mind, one can turn to questions of strikes and trade unions as avenues of protest without assuming an inevitable progression from inchoate outbursts to a class-conscious, militant labor union supported by a socialist political party. Indeed, these activities form only part of a spectrum of actions characteristic of new industrial labor forces in general and of the Upper Silesian workers in particular, a picture to be understood fully only when many other aspects of industrial life are investigated.
Upper Silesia as a focus of interest has been neglected by Western historians, but it is ideal for a case study of the development of this mutual learning process between employers and employees in a situation complicated by national rivalries between Germans and Poles. In mining this clash took the form of German bosses and Polish workers; in the metal industry, Polish and German workers showed little inclination for common action. The choice of the area needs little justification for those familiar with the course of the industrialization of Imperial Germany or for those conversant with the claim of Polish scholars that this area is to be considered as part of the Prussian partition area of Poland. This tiny pocket of counties in the extreme southeast of Prussia, bordering on Moravia, Galicia and Russian Poland, was marked by a complex of mining and smelting industries, based on extensive local deposits of coal, zinc and, before the 1890s, iron. Coal mining had been important here even in the eighteenth century, but it was only with the industrial boom starting in the 1850s and the legal reforms freeing mining and smelting from close state supervision (1850s-1865) that industry came to dominate the local economy.

German historians before 1914 were concerned with debating the myth of Frederick the Great in Silesia; and after World War I, the question of the partition of Upper Silesia between Germany and Poland dominated the work of historians interested in the area. German scholars have in the main lost interest since the Second World War, leaving the field open to irredentist propagandists. After 1945 historical polemics also received an impetus from the Polish desire to illustrate the ancient Polish right to the annexed Silesia, and for a few years questions of modernization and industrialization were subordinated to nationalism and a vulgar Marxism. By the mid-1950s, however, the older Polish tradition of high-quality historical writing again emerged; and since then polemics of class have often been subordinated to the same standards of historical research as those applied in the West. Not that Marxism or Polish nationalism have been abandoned, but they form a background for historical studies in the same way that the ideologies of historians from non-Communist countries set the tone of their works. Quotations from the classics are no longer proferred as proof of simplistic assertions about social change.
There remains one significant nationalistic commitment of Polish historians which sometimes obstructs an understanding of the past. Since 1945 these historians have added Silesia to the nineteenth-century "Polish lands," an assumption which may bolster current political claims but which often obfuscates historical understanding of the role of the Prussian government and of the ethnic Germans in the area. Of course, this border question does not alter the perception that the existence of a majority Polish community and a minority German one helped create patterns of labor protest and labor organization different from those observed in the Ruhr valley, the other heavy industrial center of Imperial Germany, or in the Dabrowa basin, the mining area just across the border in Russian Poland.

Among the different forms of labor protest, the most visible is a mass refusal to work. In early periods of industrialization spontaneous strikes of workers revolved not only around questions of wages and hours but also around changes in traditional rule-making relationships. Particularly in the 1860s and 1870s, when both employers and employees were still adjusting to the withdrawal of the government High Mining Office from close supervision of mining and smelting operations in Prussia, a great deal of conflict developed over the uncertainty of rule-making power. Workers like those at the Baildon smelter (near Kattowitz) around 1870 were still inclined to look to government officials for redress of grievances brought on by what were considered high-handed acts of employers.6

It quickly became apparent, however, that government bureaucrats would now abstain from interfering in the web of rule being established in private industry; from then on "bargaining" of all sorts could be carried on only at the plant level without interference from higher authorities. In fact, even the government-owned facilities—mines near Königshütte and Zabrze and smelters in Friedrichshütte and Gleiwitz—after 1865 were administered by bureaucrats who applied standards of management indistinguishable from those used by private mine and smelter administrations.7 A further strain in the relations between workers and their employers arose even in the business prosperity before 1873 when owners began to rationalize the old, non-profit-oriented work rules in order to promote greater production.8 Following the 1873
crash and the ensuing depression, the trend toward cutting costs accelerated, a process which included laying off the most inefficient sections of the still relatively small labor force.⁹ Now, more stringent work rules swept aside older patterns of condoning unwritten perquisites of employment and laxity at work, the “indulgency pattern.”¹⁰ Thus, the largest pre-1889 strike in Upper Silesia, at the König mine in Königshütte in 1871, resulted from the introduction of a more efficient system of checking daily attendance at work.¹¹ One should be careful to note, though, that production problems in those early years did not result simply from the unwillingness of miners and smelter workers to abide by a new sort of industrial discipline, but also by difficulties of adjustment on the management side—the supervisors on the plant level often beat their workers, and the level of fines deducted from wages was so great that on paydays police had to be on duty at some mines to forestall rioting.

The local social structure exacerbated these clashes; in particular the dichotomy between the Polish and German communities runs as a leitmotif throughout the pre-1914 period in Upper Silesia. For example, Hugo Solger, the chief government official of the area of the mining and smelting basin (the then Beuthen County), blamed disorders at the König mine in 1871 on the conflict between the Polish Catholic working masses and the German Protestant officials.¹² Only some two decades later did German workers become more numerous; but even metallurgy, where they were most prominent, continued to employ enough Poles to be split into national communities.

Although occasional references to other labor disturbances in these first decades of free-enterprise mining and smelting appear in extant sources, it is difficult or impossible to differentiate between clashes based on further restrictions of the indulgency pattern and those prompted by a call for higher wages. In all likelihood the two were mixed in such affairs as the 1873 strike at the Scharley zinc mine, where workers “went limp” in the face of the police.¹³ The ineffective strike at the nearby Cäcilie zinc mine in the same year signalled the end of work stoppages for a while because widespread unemployment set in with the “Great Depression.” For the next 16 years archival sources mention only some 13 small strikes plus hints of a few others.¹⁴ Despite a long-term trend of
expanding output in the coal and iron industries,\textsuperscript{15} the short-ter
term business lag of those years undercut potential strike action
because of the likelihood of unemployment at the slightest down-
turn of demand, such as that witnessed at the Friedrich smelter in
1878.\textsuperscript{16}

During this wrangling over control of the work-place, prelimi-
nary efforts at unionization were made by socialists and Hirsch-
Duncker union organizers, but they met with little success. The
short-lived mining unions of the late 1860s were opposed by Karol
Miarka in his influential newspaper \textit{Katolik}, which was designed to
counter the pernicious, atheistic appeal of the socialist-oriented
trade unions. This incipient nationalist feeling remained quite
crude in the 1870s as \textit{Katolik} stressed anti-Semitism and a rigid
kind of Polish Catholicism, apparent in articles like "Secrets of the
Talmud."\textsuperscript{17} By the early 1880s, anti-Semitism was no longer its
primary concern, but attacks on Jews were still common. By the
1890s, a Christian union became permissible; and Polish national-
ism, Catholicism and anti-socialism came to constitute the basis of
most \textit{Katolik} articles.

The lean years of the 1880s were not devoid of attempts to
organize workers—e.g., the St. Barbara Verein der Berg- und
Hüttenarbeiter zu Königshütte, the Chrześcijański Związek Robot-
ników w Katowicach (Christian Union of Workers in Kattowitz)
and others.\textsuperscript{18} All of these groups faded quickly, primarily due to
the supply of labor significantly exceeding demand. Conflict on
the plant level remained far more important than industry-wide
organized protest, at least until the last few years before the
outbreak of World War I.

Employment and production began to rise in the late 1880s;
and by the early 1890s Upper Silesian mining, and to a lesser
extent smelting and metallurgy, had reached the point in their
expansion where they employed more than 75,000 workers (about
half the local labor force); heavy industrial employment increased
to about 200,000 in 1913 (still about half). The rapid absolute
growth is apparent not only in global figures but also in the
beginning of a management complaint about a shortage of labor, a
complaint which was to grow ever stronger from the late 1880s to
1914.\textsuperscript{19} The strain in the labor market gave an impetus to two
major trends: one, from management an effort to bypass the
regular labor market by using women, minors and annual seasonal migrants from Russian Poland and Austrian Galicia; and two, from workers a rising labor militancy.

Employment policies of top management cannot be discussed here at any length. Women and minors played significant roles in Upper Silesia, but their number remained constant after 1895. The number of Slavic workers, however, was a variable on which employers set great hope. Although the social implications of the seasonal importation of workers into Imperial Germany are complex, this issue will be touched on only as it relates to the effects of the labor shortage. Suffice it to say that agrarian pressure groups were the primary force which brought about the changes in state policy allowing this population movement, which eventually included hundreds of thousands of people, the majority of whom were employed in agriculture. However, a number of heavy industrial employers also profited from this program, including seven mines which at one point had work forces composed of 20 percent or more foreign workers. The total number of migrants in the 1890s was small, never above 3,000 (2 to 3 percent of the mining force—few worked in smelting). After 1900 the labor market grew even tighter and urgent managerial requests for seasonal workers punctuated periods of prosperity. In 1904 the Poles from abroad (from 1905 Poles and Ruthenians) numbered over 4 percent of the mining force and from 1908-1913 constituted 15 percent or more of the labor force in mining. It is hard to gauge the impact of these potentially strike-breaking foreigners on the natives' labor action, but it was probably not decisive. After all, the largest strike in the entire prewar period took place in 1913, exactly when the number of aliens reached its peak.

The second major effect of the labor shortage, one more to the point at issue, was the rise in labor militancy. 1889 was the year of significant strike activity in all the major German mining areas. Although the Upper Silesian action lasted only five days, it involved about 15,000 men (30 percent of the coal miners and 13 percent of the ore miners) and engulfed about half the coal mines and one third of the ore mines in the area. The smelting and metal-working industries had no large strikes for many more years, or at least disturbances in that area have not been noted in the
materials now available for study. Furthermore, that year saw the formation in Upper Silesia of a Polish labor union type organization, now endorsed by Katolik, the Society for Mutual Aid of Christian Workers in Upper Silesia (Związek Wzajemnej Pomocy Chrześcijańskich Robotników Górnośląskich), a group which in 1908 merged with other groups in Germany into the Polish Professional Union (Zjednoczenie Zawodowe Polskie).

In 1889 and in strikes of the 1890s the striking miners presented demands that in the main are reminiscent of highly industrialized states. Thus they wanted higher pay, shorter working hours and improved fringe benefits. On the other hand, unrest in 1889 was also traceable to the workers’ complaints that they did not know what the work rules were. More particularly, they protested that when paid by the shift and not by piecework some of their shifts were not recorded if the demanded “normal production” was not delivered. Even more resented were the practices of forced overtime and of imposing fines in the form of temporary demotion to poorly paid positions. Finally, fringe benefits like free coal and cheap food were being undercut by delivery in the form of shoddy goods.

This second set of nonmonetary complaints reflects a situation not of worker reluctance to adopt the discipline demanded by modern industrial enterprise, but of management unwillingness to abandon the paternalism and high-handed ways commonly found in the early years of industrialization. Contrary to the assumption commonly made by students of modernizing situations, entrepreneurs and corporate leaders are often mistaken in formulating policies assumed appropriate to their own economic needs, sometimes even preferring to function on the basis of social prejudices. For example, the much vaunted labor shortage may have been due to extraordinarily low wages; and worker grievances were not always simply due to a distaste for work, as employers would have it. Other recorded reactions to these labor stoppages of the 1890s illustrate even more sharply this false contrast between the modernizing entrepreneur and the backward peasant turned industrial worker. Thus the directors of the government mines run by the Berginspektion Königshütte commented that workers, particularly unskilled ones, complained of inadequate wages not because wages were too low but because they
squandered their money—thus the workers’ “laziness” and “disorderly life.” The mine directors also took the local working population to task for its “luxuriousness in clothing” and its “irresponsibly contracted marriages.” Such pseudo-paternalism came out clearly in the threat of Friedrich Bernhardi, general director of the Giesche mining conglomerate, to evict striking miners from company housing at the Wildsteinseggen mine in 1890. Employers may have been serving their own interests with such comments, but there is no reason for the observer to judge workers’ actions by the same standards.

One must not go so far in the other direction to say that workers were ready to be efficient and disciplined industrial employees if only the employers had dealt with them differently. Absenteeism remained a significant problem down to 1914; even the incentive of bonuses for regular attendance was insufficient to curb this practice. Rapid turnover of workers also was common. These practices are sometimes assumed to be reflections of a pre-industrial mentality, when extra income is traded for leisure at a relatively low level; but it can also be contended that these patterns of behavior were simultaneously being used to express discontent with working conditions at a time when trade unions were not available to express such dissatisfaction.

Rising demand for coal from the late 1880s on and a vigorous expansion of all the local heavy industries starting in the late 1890s led workers to expect higher wages, but such demands can best be placed in context by understanding them as part of a whole series of differences over conditions of work. Thus the 14 strikes in the core mining and smelting region (Bethune County) in the 1890s were all extremely short-lived, usually one to two days, indicating a burst of anger over particular working conditions, not a long-term movement for higher wages. So at the Deutschland mine in Schwientochlowitz in 1893 the police and army intervened to end a walkout over forced Sunday work, a lengthened work day and threatened dismissals for malingering or destroying material. Elsewhere, at the Jakub mine of the giant Kattowitzer AG fur Bergbau und Eisenhuttenbetrieb, the local government administrator reported that one of the major elements in a strike of 1897 was resentment at the new manager, who was proving to be much more energetic than his predecessor,
presumably through efforts to increase profits by undoing the prevailing indulgency pattern. Short strikes also broke out over raised production norms, such as at the Charlotte mine in Rybnik in 1903, but it is hard to know if such tightening of management can be described as cutting laxity or merely as a general desire to increase profits.

Modern students of labor strife tend to look for wage demands and organized groups pressing such demands. True, workers cared about wages—the major grievance in the Wolfgang mine strike in 1897—but such a concern must be seen as part of a package of attempts by workers to maintain or improve their status in many ways. It is only with the large-scale strike movement of 1905-1907, the most significant such period since the great strike of 1889, that an integrated set of demands appeared, one that seems in part to have been prompted by labor union planning: higher wages, shorter working hours, improved working conditions and union recognition. Yet the sources for these years also indicate a series of often isolated, uncoordinated outbreaks, perhaps encouraged in part by union organizing, but more likely the result of miners’ taking advantage in an unorganized way of the heightened labor shortage brought on by a brisk demand for coal and zinc. Even though the government was allowing the immigration of Polish and Ruthenian seasonal workers in record numbers, management was too hard-pressed to wait out strikes or even to try to impose blacklists of workers, as had ordinarily been the practice. In the Rybnik region, where the first strikes of 1905 took place, 500 discharged workers found almost immediate reemployment in the very same area, while most of the workers dismissed for striking at the Konig mine were rehired very quickly by the same mine.

So far this paper has laid emphasis on worker protest as expressed at individual mines. Trade unions, as we have seen, for a long time remained minor elements on the Upper Silesian scene. In contrast to the Ruhr, no Otto Hué appeared to salvage the socialist miners’ union; certainly the German Social Democrats were of no aid here, being pictured as both German and atheist. The Polish socialists (PPS) did little better, even though their publications in the 1890s illustrated an understanding of the attachment of the
local worker to the church with such articles as "The Worker's Catechism" and the "Ten Commandments for Workers."  

During the stormy strike years of 1905-1907, rival unions engaged in some common action, but no long-term cooperative effort developed. The Society for Mutual Aid was the largest of the local groups, growing from 5,000 members in 1896 to about 14,000 in 1900. However, there were severe fluctuations in membership in ensuing years, to be noted presently. The Social Democratic miners' union, the "Alter Verband," had made few inroads into the primarily Polish-speaking local labor force; occasionally it was credited with adding to worker unrest, but that was all. Other unions were even less effective, such as the Organization of Catholic Unions based in Berlin. In addition, all of these organizations appealed primarily to miners; smelting workers and metal workers remained impervious to any union blandishments during the entire pre-war period.

On the other hand, the Polish-speaking, church-oriented Society for Mutual Aid did enroll quite a few members, as in the late 1890s, only to subside soon after. After the strike years of 1905-1907, the society went into temporary decline, dropping to under 4,000 members in 1908. That date, however, marked a turning point in unionization. The Society for Mutual Aid merged with Polish trade unions in the Ruhr and in Posen to form the Polish Professional Organization (ZZP), and from then on membership in the Upper Silesian mining and smelting groups of the union climbed rapidly, though sporadically.

Strikes in Germany seem to have moved in waves, occurring in the Ruhr, the Saar and Upper Silesia at approximately the same time, almost always during a period of business prosperity and near full employment. This coincidence was obvious in 1889 and 1905-1907; 1912 provides an even clearer case of mutual encouragement by miners, as strikes broke out in England, France, the Ruhr and in the Dabrowa basin of Russian Poland (bordering on Upper Silesia). Upper Silesia followed in 1913.

The 1913 strike of Upper Silesian coal, zinc and lead miners was unusual in several ways. First of all, it was a union-organized strike—by the ZZP, the Social Democratic Union of German Miners and the miniscule Hirsch-Duncker unions—and as such was
the first coordinated labor protest in the industrial history of Upper Silesia. Although only about 15-20 percent of all Upper Silesian miners were organized (at least 20,000 men in a mining force of about 120,000), at one point in May, 1913, some 55 percent of all crews were striking.4.0

The change in the character of worker demands was truly evident in the major demands, centering on a pay raise and the introduction of an eight-hour day and mentioning little about work rules. It is also noteworthy that for the first time the strikers were essentially the skilled hewers, while the younger workers and semi-skilled and unskilled haulers tended to report to work; in previous large-scale strike actions the social alignment had been the reverse.4.1

All of these points—the coordinated union activity, the essentially economic demands and the leadership of the more established workers—point clearly to the changing nature of labor protest. Miners were now set in their occupations and had adjusted to employer-employee relationships which they had earlier been reluctant to accept. Certainly wage cuts and extension of hours would not have been tolerated quietly, but this new kind of protest indicates that the definition of the everyday routine of mining seems gradually to have declined as a source of tension. Industrial labor discipline in large measure had been accepted; conflict now arose within a supposedly common pattern of rules at least from the side of labor.

On the other hand, management still functioned under the assumptions of an earlier age. Mining and smelting employers in pre-1914 Germany were known for their bitter opposition to union activity and any displays of worker independence. In contrast to the usual picture of new industrial workers refusing to adopt the requirements of factory labor, in the 1913 strike in Upper Silesia management again showed itself unready or unwilling to accept labor as a valid contributor to the process of structuring the work-place. That employers should defeat a strike is nothing novel, but their propaganda was quite absurd. In addition to mouthing the usual slogans about adequate wages, decent hours and superb working conditions, industrial managers drew on the German-Polish difficulties of Prussia and Germany to support the case that the chief purpose of the strike was “... the
weakening of Germandom in Upper Silesia. So went the general judgment on such political demands as the eight-hour day. Significantly, the mine inspectors' reports of the strikes did not even mention Polish nationalism as having any influence in this case. Even though some corporation directors may truly have believed in an immediate threat from Polish nationalism, it is hard to picture this charge as anything more than a red herring designed to undercut any potential public support for a strike led by a Polish union and as a sign of absolute unwillingness to consider a changing role for workers, despite the numerous legal changes in working conditions after 1900. It seems that managers needed to be "modernized" fully as much as workers did.

A look backwards over the whole era of rapid industrialization reveals a clear coincidence of years of heightened worker protest with the five “boom” periods noted by Arthur Spiethoff in the German economy of 1870 to 1913: 1870-1872, 1889, 1896-1899, 1903-1906, and 1910-1912. Although there may have been at times short lags between Upper Silesian conditions and the German average, the general periodization is the same. Data on worker protest indicate an upsurge of activity precisely in these years, though not so vehement in the late 1890s as in the other years; in each case unrest abated when faced with a downturn in business, the lessening of the labor shortage and the threat of unemployment. Most interesting is the way these worker demands changed in nature. The conflicts in the early 1870s were in large measure the result of changes in work rules intended to make the labor force more productive; these changes were resented because they were clearly curtailing the privileges hitherto enjoyed by workers. 1889 witnessed the same clash over work rules, but many of the old patterns of indulgence had been muted and now the question of wages became important. Perquisites of mining jobs were still valued highly, but arrangements for free or cheap coal or reduced-price food had now been regularized as a condition of work, not as a sort of right over which workers exercised ultimate control. In the late 1890s and in 1905-1907 worker complaints turned more and more to wages, hours and other working conditions bearing on pay—like the measurement of coal produced. Finally, in the 1913 strike wages stood out as the key demand.
Boom periods, of course, did not cause such activity; they merely presented the opportunity for workers to press their desires. Were one to focus on recession periods, in all probability the same conflicts would emerge but with management better able to determine the changing rules of the work-place. The long-term trend, however, was obviously one in which workers came to recognize the right of owners and management to set and control the general conditions of work and in which the workers came increasingly to focus their grievances on issues directly affecting the amount of pay they received and the number of hours they worked. The emphasis here on periods of prosperity shows how grievances began to be frequently expressed through mass actions, sometimes organized by trade unions or by individual activity like frequent absenteeism and high job turnover. This development accompanied worker acquiescence in a labor discipline thought necessary to run large-scale mining and smelting industries in the industrial age; in short, there emerged what one would from a later perspective call a “modern” industrial labor force.

FOOTNOTES

1. Abbreviations used in these footnotes are: WAP—provincial archive; PAP—county archive; BIKH—Berghinspektion Konigshutte; JRGB—Jahresberichte der Königlichen Regierungsm.- und Gewerberate und Bergbehörden; ZBHS—Zeitschrift für das Berg-Hutten- und Salinenwesen; ZOBH—Zeitschrift des Oberschlesischen Berg- und Huttenmannischen Vereins. Materials from archives in Poland are designated by location of archive, collection, volume number and page number (if not paginated, by date whenever possible). Place names are given in the language officially in use at the time being discussed.


11. These remarks on the 1871 strike are based on information in Jończyk, pp. 349, 312, 313-14.


15. Data on output and employment given throughout this paper are taken from ZOBH, 1868-1914, and ZBHS, 1854-1914 (official publication of the Prussian state), compiled by Kazimierz Popiolek, *Górnośląski przemysł górniczo-hutniczy w drugiej połowie XIX wieku* (The Upper Silesian mining and smelting industry in the second half of the 19th century), (Katowice: Śląski Instytut, 1965), pp. 205-30.


18. Editor’s notes, Grabowska, pp. 207-11, based on WAP Katowice, Landratur Kattowitz 530, pp. 3-5, and Landratur Kattowitz 228.

19. Schofer, pp. 27-34.


22. Data on the number of foreign workers are presented by Brozek, pp. 55-57, based on German archives in Merseburg and Wroclaw.


25. This assumption seems to underlie the reasoning present in one of the best introductions to questions of labor in industrializing situations—Clark Kerr, John T. Dunlop, Frederick Harbison and Charles A. Myers, Industrialism and Industrial Man (New York: Oxford, 1964), esp. pp. 3-13 and 140-65 on the stages of commitment.


32. JRGB, 1903, p. 507.


34. JRGB, 1907, pp. 526-27. See also JRGB, 1905, pp. 490-91; 1906, p. 565.


36. Gazeta robotnicza (PPS newspaper), 11 February 1893; 12 August 1893.

38. WAP Katowice, Landratur Katowitz 127, pp. 179-80, reproduced in Grabowska, pp. 381-82.

39. Felicja Figowa, Związki robotników polskich w byłej rejencji opolskiej w przededniu pierwszej wojny światowej (Unions of Polish workers in the former Regierungsbezirk Oppeln on the eve of World War I), (Opole: Instytut Śląski, 1966), p. 11, based on WAP Opole and “Correspondenzblatt der Generalkomission der Gewerkschaften Deutschlands.”


41. Ibid.

42. ZOBH, LII (1913), p. 275.

43. JRGB, 1913, p. 631.